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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Federal Coal Leasing Amendment Act of 19761 (FCLAA)
provides that the federal surface coal royalty will be 12.5% "of the
value of coal as defined by regulation."2 From this innocuous beginning, this country has embarked upon a federal regulatory odyssey with
respect to coal valuation, which, thus far, has taken us from (i) the
value of coal (FCLAA)3 , (ii) to gross value,4 (iii) to gross proceeds.5
Federal administrative kingdoms are being built at the expense of
coal operators and coal customers alike. The ingenuity and creativity of
the bureaucratic mind are constantly at play, most particularly since the
promulgation by the Minerals Management Service (MMS) of its
"gross proceeds" definition on January 13, 1989.6 While it may be
harsh to say that this recent evolution of coal valuation standards is
motivated solely by avarice and greed, it is difficult to escape the
conclusion that the current regulatory infrastructure bears scant resemblance to the centuries old concepts and constructions attendant to

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
premised
6.

Pub. L. No. 94-377, 90 Stat. 1087 (Aug. 4, 1976).
30 U.S.C. § 207(a) (1988).
Id.
41 Fed. Reg. 20252 (1976).
30 C.F.R. § 206.251 (1994). The current regulations upon which this article is
became effective July 1, 1994.
54 Fed. Reg. 1492 (1989) (codified at 30 C.F.R. § 206.251 (1994)).
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mineral royalties, or to the prior seventy years of federal stewardship
with respect to coal production royalties.
The ensuing discussion will address select federal coal valuation
issues and the evolving administrative practice before the MMS. Because such an undertaking is exceedingly broad and, at the same time,
marked by a paucity of answers, the valuation issues section will be
limited to providing a perspective with respect to the MMS "policy"
concerning such issues. The administrative appeals section will attempt
to expose certain procedures and practices before the MMS. In both
sections, the topic progression is chronological, rather than indicating
an inferred importance. Additionally, there are numerous other MMS
related and post-MMS issues and practices that will not be discussed.7
II.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF COAL VALUATION

Historically, mineral production royalties evolved from the "King's
share" to the more traditional concept of economic rent paid to the
mineral lessor for the right to extract the mineral. The common law
concepts and attributes attendant to a mineral production royalty are
well established. A "royalty" has been variously described as including:
(a)
(b)
(c)

a percentage paid to the British crown, of gold or silver taken
from mines, or a tax enacted in lieu thereof;
the share of the product or profit reserved by the owner for
permitting another to use the property; and
the amount paid by the lessee, or operator, to the owner of
land, mineral rights or mine equipment, based on a certain
amount per ton or a percent of total mineral production.'

In the federal context before the enactment of FCLAA in 1976,
the only applicable statutory provision provided that the federal coal

7. Examples of additional MMS and post-MMS topics which are not discussed in this
Article include: reporting procedures, including estimated royalty payments; washing allowances; transportation allowances; non-ann's length contracts; penalties; administrative off-sets;
Indian royalties; and administrative appeals and judicial challenges beyond the MMS jurisdiction.
8. BUREAU OF MINES, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, DICTIONARY OF MINING, MINERAL & RELATED TERMs, 746-47 (1968).
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production royalty would be a minimum of five cents per ton.9 In
turn, as all federal coal leases since 1920 had been issued on a "cents
per ton" basis, the United States Geological Survey's (USGS), now the
MMS, royalty determinations had been primarily limited to ascertaining
the number of tons produced."
In the early 1970s, there was a perception that the federal government and its citizenry were not receiving a fair economic return
from the development of federal coal reserves. In that context, the
USGS began to experiment with percentage based, or ad valorem, production royalties, which were premised upon the sales price of the
coal. In 1973, the USGS proposed new "Coal Mining Operating Regulations," to include Section 211.61, which was entitled "Basis for Royalty Computation." Therein, the USGS endeavored to posit a "sales
price" basis for the determination of federal production royalties." In
1975, the USGS published additional proposed operating regulations,
which, in Section 211.61, first recited a "value" basis for royalty computations." On May 17, 1976, final "Coal Mining Operating Regulations" were promulgated, to include Section 211.63, which was entitled
"Value basis for royalty computation" and provided (i) that the value
of the coal for royalty purposes would be the "gross value" at the
point of sale and (ii) that the gross value would be the "sale or contract unit price" times the number of units sold. 3
On August 4, 1976, just three months after the promulgation by
the USGS of the first value based royalty regulations, FCLAA was
enacted and provided, in part, that:
A lease shall require payment of a royalty in such amount as the Secretary shall determine of not less than 12/2 per centum of the value of coal
as defined by regulation, except the Secretary may determine a lesser
amount in the case of coal recovered by underground mining operations. 4

9. 30 U.S.C. § 207 (repealed by Section 6 of FCLAA (1988)).
10. See U.S.G.S. Operating Regulations to Govern Coal-Mining Methods and the Safety and Welfare of Miners on Leased Lands on the Public Domain, § 18 (Third Printing
1968). The U.S.G.S. is currently known as the MMS.
11. 38 Fed. Reg. 10686 (1973).
12. 40 Fed. Reg. 41122 (1975).
13. 41 Fed. Reg. 20252 (1976).
14. Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act, 30 U.S.C. § 207(a) (1988) (emphasis add-

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol97/iss4/4

4

McGee: Coal Royalty Valuation: The Federal Perspective

1995]

COAL ROYALTY VALUATION

Armed with such bland statutory authority, as referenced at the
outset of this article, the USGS/MMS and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) have crafted coal valuation standards, which have evolved
from (i) the value of coal, i" (ii) to gross value, 6 (iii) to gross proceeds. 7 The net effect of this evolution is the current regulatory definition of "gross proceeds," promulgated on January 13, 1989, providing
that:
Gross proceeds (for royalty payment purposes) means the total monies and
other consideration accruing to a coal lessee for the production and disposition of the coal produced. Gross proceeds includes, but is not limited to,
payments to the lessee for certain services such as crushing, sizing, screening, storing, mixing, loading, treatment with substances including chemicals
or oils, and other preparation of the coal to the extent that the lessee is
obligated to perform them at no cost to the Federal Government or Indian
lessor. Gross proceeds, as applied to coal, also includes but is not limited
to reimbursements for royalties, taxes or fees, and other reimbursements.
Tax reimbursements are part of the gross proceeds accruing to a lessee
even though the Federal or Indian royalty interest may be exempt from
taxation. Monies and other consideration, including the forms of consideration identified in this paragraph, to which a lessee is contractually (sic)
or legally entitled but which it does not seek to collect through reasonable
efforts are also part of gross proceeds. 8

The extension of the MMS's "gross proceeds" concept is the ensuing
pronouncement that:
If the MMS determines that the gross proceeds accruing to the lessee
pursuant to an arm's length contract do not reflect the reasonable value of
the production because of misconduct by or between the contracting parties, or because the lessee otherwise has breached its duty to the lessor to
market the productionfor the mutual benefit of the lessee and the lessor,
then MMS shall require that the coal production be valued pursuant to
paragraph (c)(2)(ii), (iii), (iv), or (v) of this section. . . . When MMS
determines that the value may be unreasonable, MMS will notify the lesed).
15. Id.
16. 41 Fed. Reg. 20252 (1976).
17. 30 C.F.R. § 206.251 (1994). See app. I (summarizing the proposed and final
USGS/MMS and BLM coal valuation regulations).
18. 30 C.F.R. § 206.251 (1994).
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see and give the lessee an opportunity to provide written information justifying the lessee's reported coal value. 9

The extreme of this "gross proceeds" audacity is the MMS's regulatory
assertion that:
Value shall be based on the highest price a prudent lessee can receive
through legally enforceable claims under its contract. Absent contract
revision or amendment, if the lessee fails to take proper or timely action
to receive prices or benefits to which it is entitled, it must pay royalty at
a value based upon that obtainable price or benefit. Contract revisions or
amendments shall be in writing and signed by all parties to an arm'slength contract, and may be retroactively applied to value for royalty purposes for a period not to exceed two years, unless MMS approves a longer period. If the lessee makes timely application for a price increase
allowed under its contract but the purchaser refuses, and the lessee takes
reasonable measures, which are documented, to force purchaser compliance, the lessee will owe no additional royalties unless or until monies or
consideration resulting from the price increase are received. This paragraph shall not be construed to permit a lessee to avoid its royalty payment obligation in situations where a purchaserfails to pay, in whole or
in part or timely, for a quantity of coal.2"

The foregoing can and should be referred to as a regulatory fiction-an artificial valuation mechanism. Contrary to the federal oil and
gas infrastructure, there is absolutely no common law or mandated
statutory basis for the MMS's regulatory precepts. In short, it is an
MMS fabrication. Be this as it may, the MMS regulatory "blueprint" is
both creative and embryonic; the MMS is making it up as they go
along. Unfortunately, it has taken only six years since January 13,
1989, to reverse six centuries of royalty principles and precedent. This
evolution is an odyssey because no one knows where this inquisition
will lead or how invasive it may yet become.

19. 30 C.F.R. § 206.257(b)(3) (1994) (emphasis added).
20. Id. at § 206.257(i) (emphasis added).
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III. THESIS
By way of prospective, the MMS thesis with respect to the
1989 Coal Product Valuation Regulations21 is that federal production
royalty will be assessed (i) on all payments which are received, or
should have been collected, by a lessee and (ii) on all costs which are
paid by a third party and are attributable to the production and/or sale
of federal coal. Stated differently, the application of this "gross proceeds" thesis is simplistic and can be reduced to the following twopronged inquiry:
(1) Did the lessee receive a payment?
(2) Did the buyer pay for or contributed anything which is not included in the purchase
price?
If the answer to either question is "yes," the MMS will likely assert
that federal production royalty is owing. It can certainly be argued
that this prospective MMS thesis accords scant recognition to such
market realities as sales price, fair market value, or a sale at the current market price.
Additionally, the MMS is attempting to infuse three concepts into
federal coal valuation. First, the MMS establishes a fiduciary relationship standard between the lessor and lessee in the marketing of federal
coal, as opposed to the traditional reasonable and prudent operator
standard. Second, an implied marketing covenant, whereby the lessee is
required to obtain on behalf of the lessor the best price, the most preferred terms, and the highest revenue return to the lessor in the marketing of federal coal is established. Finally, a third-party beneficiary
right is conferred with respect to the benefits of the lessee's coal sales
agreements.
At present, the MMS is brazenly endeavoring to structure an "all
benefits, no risk" production royalty relationship. In so doing, it is,

21.

30 C.F.R. §§ 206.250 to -.265 (1994).
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again, apparently irrelevant that there is no common law or mandated
statutory basis for the MMS's nurturing of such precepts.
Unfortunately, resolution of federal coal valuation issues is seldom
premised upon right and wrong, fairness, equity, or even judicial precedent. Additionally, a political reality that must be acknowledged is that
the respective states realize fifty cents on each dollar of federal production royalty. In the final analysis, there is no political downside for
the MMS and the respective states to adopt expansive, aggressive interpretations with respect to coal valuation issues.
A. Discussion of Select MMS Coal Valuation Issues
This section will address select federal coal valuation issues that
are emerging issues currently under extensive discussion in the coal
industry. There are numerous other current valuation issues, and the
parade will continue, with as yet unfathomed extensions and further
outright reversals of current interpretations.
For purposes of this discussion, the 1989 Coal Product Valuation
Regulations, 2 as amended by the 1990 Exclusions Withdrawal,' will
be accepted, without further diatribe. 4 However, one frustration is the
MMS's propensity to quote its preamble statements as gospel when
they support its confirmation of regulatory construction and, conversely,
to totally ignore them when they do not advance the MMS's expansion
of policy.
Having been lulled into a false sense of compromise, the coal
industry chose not to challenge the 1989 Coal Product Valuation Regulations and its "gross proceeds" cornerstone. Consequently, if such a
challenge is to be asserted, it would have to be brought by an individual coal operator within six years after the right of action arose
(being January 13, 1989, or January 12, 1995), or it may be time-

22. 30 C.F.R. §§ 206.250 to -.265 (1994).
23. Id.
24. Unless otherwise stated, all citations to regulatory sections herein are to 30 C.F.R.
§§ 206.250 to -.265, as originally promulgated in 54 Fed. Reg. 1492 (1989), being the
"1989 Coal Product Valuation Regulations," and as amended in 55 Fed. Reg. 35427 (1990),
being the "1990 Exclusions Withdrawal."

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol97/iss4/4

8

McGee: Coal Royalty Valuation: The Federal Perspective

1995]

COAL ROYALTY VALUATION

barred." With respect to the MMS's withdrawal of the compromise
"crumb" concerning the 1989 exclusion of abandoned mine land fees,
black lung excise taxes, and severance taxes from valuation, the coal
industry
challenge to the 1990 Exclusions Withdrawal was unsuccess26
fuL

1. Marketable Condition
The concept of first marketable condition is a "cultural" issue with
the MMS, in that it is one of the underlying concepts upon which the
coal product valuation program is premised. In theory, the MMS would
like to mandate that all coal must be at least primarily crushed, sized
and loaded, thereby rendering a 2x0 steam coal product, or the cost
thereof will be charged and/or inferred as a component of the gross
proceeds. Unfortunately, this mandate is artificial and, sometimes, just
plain incongruous in a given factual context. However, as it is a cultural issue, the MMS premise is that the regulations are "blind," and
the MMS will not accede to any erosion of or backing off from this
artificial state of first marketability.
This MMS fabrication has evolved subsequent to the promulgation
of the 1989 Coal Product Valuation Regulations and is a blatant example of "creeping" interpretation. The current regulatory definition of
"marketable condition" merely provides that:
'Marketable condition' means coal that is sufficiently free from impurities
and otherwise in a condition that it will be accepted by a purchaser under
a sales contract typical for that area.27

In turn, Section 206.257(h) recites that the lessee is required to place
coal in marketable condition at no cost to the federal government and
that:

25. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (1988). See also Shining Rock Mining Corp. v. United
States, 906 F.2d 1362, 1364 (9th Cir. 1990).
26. NCA & AMC v. Manuel Lujan, No. 90-Z-1927 (D.C. Col. Feb. 28, 1992).
27. 30 C.F.R. § 206.251 (1994).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1995

9

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 97, Iss. 4 [1995], Art. 4
896

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:887

Where the value established pursuant to this section is determined by a
lessee's gross proceeds, that value shall be increased to the extent that the
gross proceeds has been reduced because the purchaser, or any other person, is providing certain services, the cost of which ordinarily is the responsibility of the lessee to place the coal in marketable condition.28

Within these circular references, the subjective (not blind) test
should be to ascertain, on a case by case basis, what "services" are the
responsibility of the lessee in order to place the subject coal in "marketable" condition.29 In the first instance, this test must recognize that
marketable condition is a market based or driven standard and that
there are multiple coal market segments. Second, administrative notice
must be taken: (i) that coal supply exceeds coal demand; (ii) that unlike oil and gas, coal is not a fungible commodity and must be marketed aggressively in accordance with a given buyer's specification,
sizing, tonnage and delivery requirements; (iii) that as the buyer's coal
requirements are often specification or sizing specific, coal is not susceptible to entry into unlimited markets; and (iv) that an "artificial
valuation" multiplied by "nothing" (no coal sale) equals "nothing" (no
federal royalty). Third, absent fraud or other misconduct, the primary
criterion must be the specific coal product that a specific buyer is
willing to purchase for its equally specific consumption, other use, or
resale requirements. Fourth, and equally salient, administrative paranoia
should not constitute a basis for obviating the exigencies and realities
of the coal marketplace.
In this context, the MMS chose to ignore its own conclusion in
the Preamble to the 1989 Coal Product Valuation Regulations, wherein
it stated that:
[T]he conditioning of coal for market does not consist of a uniform set of
processes. Rather, the marketable condition requirement is as flexible as
the requirements of different market segments.30

28. 30 C.F.R. § 206.257(h) (1994).
29. Id.
30. 54 Fed. Reg. 1498 (1989) (emphasis added).
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In turn, while the above subjective test reflects the more reasoned and
realistic parameters of the coal marketplace, the MMS also tends to
ignore its own comparable test for marketable condition as recited in
the 1989 Preamble:
Therefore, the test of marketable condition relies on: (1) the market segment that coal is sold into; (2) the customary requirements of preparation
or conditioning normally expected by that market segment; and (3) the
typical
level of preparation or conditioning by coal producers in that
3
area. 1

The regulatory definition of "gross proceeds" does in fact provide
that gross proceeds include "payments to the lessee" for services such
as crushing, sizing, screening, storing, mixing, and loading. (if performed by the lessee/operator and reimbursed by the coal buyer).32
However, it must be recognized that there is absolutely no regulatory
provision that mandates that a coal operator must undertake primary
crushing, sizing and loading to produce a marketable coal product.
Examples of prospective fact patterns that are at variance with the
MMS's cultural interpretation of marketable condition include:
(a) a lessee/operator with a pre-FCLAA (1976) coal sales contract
(when federal production royalties were on a fixed cents per ton basis),
in which the sales price does not include the cost of crushing, sizing
and screening. For quality control and blending purposes, the buyer
would buy only and continue to buy only 6x0 coal and undertakes
such coal processing in its own receiving yard. The purchaser will not
buy 2x0 coal.
(b) an operator with a pre-FCLAA (1976) coal sales contract, in
which the sales price does not reflect the capital cost of a coal processing or load-out facility, which the buyer financed and installed.
The coal seller operates and maintains the load-out facility and either
includes or does not include the cost thereof in the sale price for royalty purposes.

31. Id.
32. 30 C.F.R. § 206.251 (1994).
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(c) an operator with a pre- or post-FCLAA (1976) coal sales contract, in which the sales price does not reflect the cost of a sophisticated coal sampling facility. For its specific control purposes, the buyer
needs to know the coal's specifications on an advance and detailed
basis. The buyer paid for the construction and installation of the sampling facility. The seller operates and maintains the sampling facility
and either includes or does not include the cost thereof in the sale
price for royalty purposes.
(d) an operator with a pre- or post-FCLAA (1976) sales arrangement for the sale of 6x0 coal to a custom processing facility, which
processes the coal to custom specification and resells it into industrial
and other markets. The purchaser will not buy 2x0 coal and actually
pays more for the 6x0 coal than the going rate for 2x0 coal.
(e) an operator who sells 6x0 coal to another coal operator, which
the second operator processes through its integrated crushing and rail
load-out facility and resells to its own customers. The second operator
will not buy 2x0 coal for re-processing through its integrated facility,
because double processing of 2x0 coal occasions excess fines and reduces the value and the market for the product.
In each example, the MMS would ignore such long-standing
and/or market driven arrangements and instead, attempt to infer as a
component of gross proceeds the cost attributable to rendering the
equivalent of a 2x0 coal product. This maxim controls regardless of
whether the contractual relationship between the parties has since terminated, the contract contains no contractual pass-through clause, or
the coal was sold on the spot market.
There is no basis in the current regulations for the MMS's expansive interpretation of "marketable condition" nor for its interference in
the private contractual agreements between the lessee/operator and its
coal buyers. In essence, the MMS purports to rewrite long-standing
legal and contractual sales arrangements and even to mandate what coal
product can be sold and to whom.
While administrative audits and appeals are pending on the issue
of "marketable condition," it has yet to be judicially resolved.
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2. Co-Mingled Coal
One would not anticipate that there would be current or significant
disputes concerning co-mingled coal. Actually, co-mingling is more of
an allocation or methodology problem than a valuation issue. Be this
as it may, the MMS can be reluctant to acknowledge the express terms
of coal supply agreements or to read more than one purportedly pertinent clause. In its San Juan Coal Co. decision,33 and in overruling the
MMS's weighted-average methodology for co-mingled coal, the Interior
Board of Land Appeals ("IBLA") held that the sale or contract price
must be determined based on the terms of the coal supply agreement.
The IBLA further held that when the provisions thereof specify the
sale or "unit price" for separate sources of coal, the applicable pricing
provision for federal production must be used to determine the gross
value for federal royalty purposes. In the San Juan case, as may be
surmised, the price for the non-federal coal was higher than that for
the federal coal.
In addition, the allocation of co-mingled coal, be it federal, state
and/or private, is critical in the assessment of (i) which contractual coal
is subject to federal production royalty, (ii) what is the percentage of
federal coal to total production tonnage, and (iii) whether the federal
tonnage was produced on a pre- or post-ad valorem basis. While these
distinctions should be rudimentary, such allocations can be surprisingly
illusive.
This co-mingled coal or allocation methodology applies to the
discussion of each of the ensuing valuation issues. Its application with
respect to contract settlement payments is readily obvious.
3. Non-Cash Consideration
The arena of "non-cash consideration" or "cost avoidance" is difficult. Unfortunately, straightforward business decisions and transactions

33.

San Juan Coal Co., IBLA 90-482 (June 15, 1992).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1995

13

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 97, Iss. 4 [1995], Art. 4

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:887

become suspect, especially over time and with the benefit of hindsight
or midstream rule changes.
' when read in conjuncWhile the definition of "gross proceeds,"34
tion with Sections 206.257(b)(1), (b)(2), (e), and (g), requires that
value for royalty purposes will not be less than the gross proceeds
accruing to the lessee for the disposition of produced coal, ascertaining
the value accruing to the lessee can be vexing. Examples of such noncash consideration might be asserted to include:

(a) the acquisition of federal coal reserves by the buyer,
with or without the dedication of reserves;
(b) the grant of a mine construction loan by the buyer,
with or without the dedication of reserves;
(c) the purchase of capital equipment (power shovels,
draglines, bulldozers, front-end loaders, etc.) or mine
facilities (crushers, silos, administrative buildings,
change houses, garages, etc.) by the buyer, with the
ensuing operation and maintenance thereof by the
operator;
(d) the structuring of a sale/leaseback arrangement between the operator and the buyer;
(e) the sale of coal to a non-affiliated utility at a purportedly favorable price, in return for the sale of
electricity to the operator at a reduced rate; or
(f) the sale of coal to a non-affiliated utility at a purportedly favorable price, in exchange for the acquisition by the utility of gas supplies from an affiliate
of the operator.
In reconciling such non-cash consideration situations, each case
must be considered on an ad hoc basis and resolved based upon the
specific facts, circumstances, and intent of the parties. Unfortunately,

34. 30 C.F.R. § 206.251 (1994).
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the operator's regulatory burden will be formidable,35 and an operator
should have no misgivings as to his chances of prevailing at the MMS
level.
4. Added Value
Since 1976, the cost of additional coal preparation or of additives
to the coal prior to sale were permissible deductions from "gross value" in determining value for federal royalty purposes. 6 Exceptions to
this standard were (i) treatment with chemicals to prevent freezing,
(ii) treatment with oil to suppress dust in transit, and (iii) other preparation of the coal which did not enhance the quality of the coal.37 In
practice, the test was whether the additional preparation enhanced the
inherent quality of the coal product.
The current gross proceeds definition38 places a different spin on
this prior practice by providing that gross proceeds include "payments
to the lessee" for additional "services" such as (i) treatment with substances including chemicals or oils and (ii) other preparation of the
coal to the extent that the lessee is obligated to perform them at no
cost to the federal government.39 In terms of prospective application,
it must be recognized that the coal industry has gone (i) from a "permissibility of deduction/exception" standard to an "inclusion of payment" standard or (ii) from an "inherent coal quality" standard to an
artificial "marketable condition" standard.
With respect to traditional chemical and oil treatment, the pre-1989
Coal Product Valuation Regulations "exclusion" was limited to
(i) chemicals to prevent freezing and (ii) oil to suppress dust in transit.4" The current regulatory reference to "treatment with substances
including chemicals and oils" is significantly broader.4 Does the cur-

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

30 C.F.R. § 206.257(b)(1) (1994).
See 30 C.F.R. § 211.63 (formerly 41 Fed. Reg. 20252, 20271 (1976)).
Id.
30 C.F.R. § 206.251 (1994).
Id.
30 C.F.R. § 206.250(h) (1988).
See definition of "gross proceeds" at 30 C.F.R. § 206.251 (1994).
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rent "inclusion" standard extend to buyer-requested chemical or oil
treatment to produce quicker ignition, or higher heat content, or cleaner
product burn? Will future fuel stock mixes not be allowed at all, or
will they be reviewed on a percentage of additive basis? In such instances, it is best (i) to have the buyer itself undertake any desired
enhancement, (ii) to have the buyer contract with a third party to provide the required enhancement, or (iii) to have the operator and buyer
enter into a separate service agreement for the required enhancement.
The parties should take pains to recite the buyer's specific and specialized enhancement requirements.
With respect to coal enhancement and beneficiation generally, and
especially in terms of future coal product mixes, Section 206.265 provides that if the lessee enhances the value of the coal (i) after the coal
has been placed in marketable condition (potentially, a wasteful and
costly exercise) and (ii) prior to its use, sale or other disposition, then
the value of the feedstock coal will be determined under the non-arm's
length valuation provisions in Section 206.257(c), first pursuant to
Section 206.257(c)(2)(i-iv), or second pursuant to Section
206.257(c)(2)(v). 42 To date, these determinations have been difficult.
The coal industry has asserted that the coal value should be premised
upon the spot market price or limited to the recent price for other coal
sold from the same mine. True to form, the MMS seeks a higher return for the intrinsic value of its coal. A return to a "take-in-kind"
royalty standard would solve this issue.
In addition to the foregoing, Section 206.264 provides a weak
attempt at guidance if a federal coal lease is to be developed by in-situ
or surface gasification or liquefaction technology. 43 In essence, the
lessee is to propose a valuation methodology, and the MMS will issue
a valuation determination.44
A value-added determination is clearly a work-out situation. Depending on the direction of preliminary discussions, it may be more
42. 30 C.F.R. § 206.265 (1994). Among other provisions, this determination will include a limitation on the rate of return on investment equal to twice the Standard and
Poor's BBB bond rate.
43. 30 C.F.R. § 206.264 (1994).
44. Id.
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expedient to submit a "request for value determination" pursuant to
Section 206.257(f). Having done so, the MMS is required to "expeditiously" render its valuation determination, and this MMS decision is
subject to appeal. Depending upon the import of the enhancement or
beneficiation issue, the lessee/operator may want to request a "full
force and effect" order from the secretarial level, which would be
appealable directly to a United States district court.45
5. Exclusions From Value
The 1990 Exclusions Withdrawal did not necessarily exhaust the
exclusions from valuation discussion. Pursuant to the 1989 Coal Product Valuation Regulations, as amended by the 1990 Exclusions Withdrawal, it is conceded that fees and taxes that are incurred attendant to
the "production" of the coal are royalty bearing. This would include
abandoned mine land (AML) fees and state severance taxes.
One such prospective exclusion is "excess moisture," which is
more of a tonnage determination issue than a valuation issue. In any
event, the question is whether the federal production royalty is due and
payable on coal produced or whether the lessee is also required to pay
royalty on the water absorbed by the coal after the overburden is removed, prior to shipment. In the ground, coal contains a certain percentage of inherent moisture, which is "equilibrium moisture." Once
the coal has been uncovered, it absorbs additional moisture, which is
"excess moisture."46 For example, a 2,000 pound ton of coal shipped
from the Powder River Basin may only consist of 1,950 pounds of
coal removed from the federal lease, to include the coal's equilibrium
moisture; the excess moisture would be the additional fifty pounds. It
can be argued that this excess moisture weight, and the increased dollar value of the coal occasioned by the excess moisture weight, should
be excluded from the tonnage and valuation base upon which federal
royalty is calculated.

45. 30 C.F.R. § 243.3 (1994).
46. Excess moisture is moisture determined to be the difference between total moisture
and inherent moisture.
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In essence, a coal operator is selling both coal and water to the
buyer. The buyer knows this, and this reality is standard within the
coal industry. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Office of
Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (the MMS's sister agency) recognize and allow such excess moisture weight exclusions in the
calculation of black lung excise taxes47 and AML fees,48 respectively.
Both agencies concluded that because the excess moisture is absorbed
after the coal is produced, the respective taxes and fees cannot be
assessed upon the total weight of the coal. By assessing royalty on the
total weight of the coal, the MMS is in violation of its own 1989 Coal
Product Valuation Regulations.49
While the Preamble to the 1990 Exclusions Withdrawal does reference black lung excise taxes (BLET) as being a component of value to
be included in gross proceeds, the revisions to the 1989 Coal Product
Valuation Regulations, which were effectuated thereby, had the effect
of removing any reference to BLET from the 1989 Coal Product Valuation Regulations." Consequently, the only current tax-related reference is in the gross proceeds definition, wherein gross proceeds are
'5
recited to also include "reimbursements for royalties, taxes or fees."'
In the context of this generic provision, as the value for royalty
purposes is again limited to the value of the produced coal,52 only
"taxes" which are attributable to the mining and/or the production of
coal can be royalty bearing. In turn, the Black Lung Benefits Revenue
Act of 1977"3 (BLBR Act of 1977), which was promulgated subsequent to the passage of FCLAA, provides that the BLET is only pay-

47. See definition of "coal" at 26 U.S.C. § 4121(d)(1)-(2) (1988).
48. See 53 Fed. Reg. 19718, 19724-25 (1988) (codified at 30 C.F.R. § 870.18 (1994)).
49. The following sections demonstrate this violation: 30 C.F.R. § 206.251 (1994)
(definitions of "coal" and "gross proceeds," with gross proceeds being the total consideration
for "coal produced"); 30 C.F.R. § 206.257(b)(2) (1994) (in conducting MMS audits, MMS
examines whether the contract reflects the total consideration for "coal produced"); 30 C.F.R.
§ 206.257(b)(5) (1994) (value does not include payments which were not for the purchase
of "coal production"); 30 C.F.R. § 206.257(g) (1994) (value will not be less than the gross
proceeds accruing to the lessee for "produced coal").
50. See 55 Fed. Reg. 35427 (1990).
51. 30 C.F.R. § 206.251 (1994).
52. See supra note 49.
53. 92 Stat. 11, 26 U.S.C. § 4121 (1978).
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able upon the transaction of sale, and is otherwise controlling with
respect to the nature, purpose, collection, and refund of BLETs 4
In capsule, the pertinent statutory sources supporting for the "exclusion" of the BLET as a component of value include:
(a) 26 U.S.C. Section 4121 (a), which provides that the
BLET (like other manufacturers' excise taxes) is imposed solely upon and at the point of sale of the
coal;
(b) 26 U.S.C. Section 4216 (a), which provides that in
determining the "price" for which the coal is sold,
the BLET itself is to be excluded; and
(c) 26 U.S.C. Section 6416 (a), which provides that no
credit or refund of an "overpayment" of BLET will
be allowed to the operator/seller without the buyer/
payor's written consent.
In effect, the BLET is imposed solely upon the "sale" of coal by6
the operator55 and is never part of the value of the produced coal.1
The BLET is an end-user tax or a flow through tax. The coal buyer
pays the BLET to the IRS through the operator/seller.
The statutory and regulatory framework of manufacturers' excise
taxes is long-standing and pervasive. Contrary to the bland statutory
authority of Section 6 of FCLAA to define "value" by regulation, the
provisions of manufacturers' excise tax statutes and, specifically, of the
BLBR Act of 197717 are singular and express as to the creation and
imposition of a BLET. The BLET is a manufacturers' excise tax, or an
end-user tax, and is imposed on the transaction of sale. If there is no
sale of the produced coal, the BLET is not owed. The BLET adds
absolutely nothing to the value of the coal and is merely the vehicle
for collecting an end-use tax to fund our nation's black lung welfare

54. 26 U.S.C. § 4121(a) (1988).
55. Id.
56. Id. at § 4216(a).

57. 26 U.S.C. § 4121 (1988).
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program. To that extent, it can be said that the BLET does add to the
buyer's overall cost to "consume" the coal. In confirmation of this
premise, it has been judicially held that a manufacturer's excise tax
"payment" is the property of the buyer, not that of the operator/
seller." As such, it cannot constitute a component of value for the
produced coal.
To date, although the BLET issue is on appeal before the IBLA,
neither of these prospective exclusions from gross proceeds has been
judicially reviewed.
6. Contract Settlements
Contract settlement is the hottest of the current valuation issues. It
has taken on proportions that neither the coal industry nor the MMS
anticipated. The dollar amounts can be large, and the fact patterns in
dispute are seemingly endless.
From the MMS's perspective, contract settlements include
(i) lump-sum payments, (ii) non-cash consideration, and/or (iii) the
modification of contract terms. The MMS has asserted that examples of
such agreements include:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)
(k)

Take-or-pay payments;
Capacity charges;
Payments for advanced development costs;
Prepaid reserve amounts;
Contract buy-downs;
Contract buy-outs;
Altered take commitments;
Producer damages;
Excess royalty reimbursements;
Deficient price adjustments; and
Contract disputes. 9

This issue is so pervasive and emotional within the coal industry
that it defies adequate treatment herein. However, it can be stated pur58. See Rothman v. District Director of the Internal Revenue Serv., 483 F.2d 1079
(9th Cir. 1973).
59. See app. 1.
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suant to the Diamond Shamrock case6" that a federal oil and gas royalty is only due upon the "production" of the oil and gas itself. In
fact, the MMS accepted and promulgated the 1989 Coal Product Valuation Regulations, premised upon this holding." The current conflict
concerns the regulatory construction of Section 206.257(b)(6),62 which
provides that:
The value of production for royalty purposes shall not include payments
received by the lessee pursuant to a contract which the lessee demonstrates, to MMS's satisfaction, were not part of the total consideration paid
for the purchase of coal production.6

In the Preamble to the 1989 Coal Product Valuation Regulations,
the MMS designated "General Comment 6: Royalty on Take-Or-Pay
and Other Similar Type Payments."6 Therein, the MMS acknowledged that:
In the July 15, 1988 notice (53 FR 26951), MMS requested further comments as to whether the following payments identified by industry should
be subject to royalty:
(1) Damages recovered under a court judgment for the
purchaser's breach of the sales contract;
(2) Payments made under a force majeure clause;
(3) "Settlement" payments made to terminate a sales contract before the contractually-specified termination
date; this includes situations where there may or may
not be a follow-on contract;
(4) Payments for assignment of an interest in the lease;
(5) Payments not designated as part of the purchase price
but made on a periodic or regularly scheduled basis
under the contract;
(6) Payments not designated as part of the purchase
price, which may or may not vary with the amount
of coal delivered, and paid on a one-time or not
regularly scheduled basis under the contract in a
specific sum or calculated under a prescribed formula;
60. Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co. v. Hodel, 853 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1988).
61. 54 Fed. Reg. 1497 (1989).
62. 30 C.F.R. 206.257(b)(6) (1989) (currently codified at 30 C.F.R. § 206.257(b)(5)

(1994)).
63. Id. (emphasis added).
64. 54 Fed. Reg. 1496 (1989).
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(7)

Payments or reimbursements for services or processing costs customarily the responsibility of the lessee,
including that required to put the product in marketable condition.
Many industry and several State comments agreed that absent any physical
removal of the resource from the leased property, no royalty should be
due on any type of payment received by the lessee ... "

In the same General Comment 6, and in the context of the foregoing,
the MMS cited the Diamond Shamrock case as follows:
Many cormm-ents cited the August 17, 1988, Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
decision in Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co. et al. v. Hodel, 853 F.2d
1159 (5th Cir. 1988), where the Court ruled in the context of natural gas
royalties that royalty payments are not due on receipt of take-or-pay payments, but are only due when the purchaser takes so-called "make-up" gas
(gas taken in excess of minimum quantities in later periods against the
purchase price of which previous take-or-pay payments are credited)."
In its Response to General Comment 6, the MMS stated that:
The Department has not further appealed the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Diamond Shamrock, and will apply the rationale of that decision for purposes of coal royalty valuation. Therefore, MMS's final coal regulations
have been revised from previous proposed rules by revising the definition
of 'gross proceeds' in 30 C.F.R. 206.251 to exclude the phrase '* * *
payments or credits for advanced prepaid reserve payments subject to recoupment through reduced prices in later sales; payments or credits for
advanced exploration or development costs that are subject to recoupment
through reduced prices in later sales; take-or-pay payments; and reimbursements, including but not limited to * * *.' Of course, as discussed further

below, if any of such payments at some point is used as a payment for
produced coal, then they would still be subject to royalty as gross proceeds for produced coal.
Instead, the regulations at 30 C.F.R. 205.257(b)(6) will provide lessees the
opportunity to rebut the presumption that payments received by the lessee
are not part of the total consideration paid for coal and, hence, are not
royalty bearing. Since the question at issue is not whether a payment was
made but, instead, whether that payment is part of the consideration paid
for coal, MMS would expect any rebuttal to address the commercial rela65. 54 Fed. Reg. 1497 (1989).

66. Id.
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tionship between the buyer and the seller (lessee). Specifically, MMS
would require substantial explanation of why the value paid by a purchaser, under a coal sales contract, is not equitable (sic) to the value received
by the lessee for the sale of coal. 7

In addition to the foregoing General Comment 6, the MMS also
included a separate comments section with respect to Section
206.257(b)(6).68 Therein, having reiterated that there is a presumption
that payments received by the lessee are "payments for coal production," the MMS stated that:
However, payments must indeed be payments for coal production before
any royalty is owed. Therefore, lessees will have the opportunity to come
forward with arguments as to why a particularpayment under a coal sales
contract is not part of the value of the coal production.69

In this context, the MMS stated that it would consider such factors as
(i) the terms of the sale contract, (ii) the lessee's rationale for its claim
that the payment is not part of the value of production, (iii) how the
purchaser characterizes the transaction (particularly if it is a public
utility subject to state public utilities commission regulations), and (iv)
any other relevant matters.7" The MMS then recited five "other factors," to include, in pertinent part:
(3)

'Settlement' payments made to terminate a sales contract before
the contractually-specified termination date will usually not be
considered payments for produced coal. If there is a follow-on
contract, MMS will review the circumstances to determine if
some or all of the payment is royalty bearing.

(5)

Damages recovered under a court judgment, or included in a
liquidated damages clause, that are for the purchaser's breach of
a sale contract are usually not consideredpayment for produced
coal, if they correspond to or are a reasonable estimate of the
producer's lost profit."

67.
68.
app. 2.
69.
70.
71.

54 Fed. Reg. 1497-98 (1989).
54 Fed. Reg. 1513 (1989) (codified at 30 C.F.R. § 206.257(b)(5) (1994)). See also
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
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As of January 13, 1989, the irrefutable construction of Section
206.257(b)(6) was (i) that to be royalty bearing, the contract settlement
payment had to be received for produced coal, which is coal physically
severed and removed from the ground, and (ii) that the settlement
payment had to be recouped by the same buyer through "make-up"
production as a price off-set.72 Thereafter, this MMS position was
consistent and frequently reiterated.
However, on May 3, 1993, the MMS issued a "Dear Payor Letter"
to the oil and gas industry, wherein it declared its "interpretation" that,
in essence, contract settlement payments will be royalty bearing.73 According to the MMS, the May 3, 1993, Dear Payor Letter only explains "how" the existing valuation regulations apply to contract settlement payments, especially with respect to (i) past pricing disputes,
(ii) take-or-pay payments, (iii) contract buy-downs, and (iv) contract
buy-outs.74 The MMS explained that this interpretation and policy are
consistent with judicial decisions because royalties are not owed unless
and until payment-related production occurs. However, under the heading of General Principle, the May 3, 1993 Dear Payor Letter also provides that the payment will be royalty bearing "if the mineral to which
the payment is attributable is produced and sold either to the original
purchaser or a substitute purchaser.""
While this letter was not sent to federal coal payors, it does signal
an attempted reversal of the MMS's long-standing regulatory construction concerning contract settlement payments. The letter has recently
been sent to federal coal payors on a case by case basis, as the purported authority for a given MMS Demand Letter and Bill for Collection.
Without addressing the applicability of this new-found MMS interpretation to the oil and gas industry,7 it must be concluded that the

72. See 30 C.F.R. § 206.257(b)(6) (1989).
73. See app. 3, May 3, 1993, "Dear Payor Letter" from the MMS to federal oil and
gas industry payors, regarding "monies received under contract settlements."
74. Id.
75. See app. 4.
76. See Independent Petroleum Association of America v. Babbitt, No. 93-2544-RCL,
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May 3, 1993, Dear Payor Letter (i) clearly violates Section
206.257(b)(6) of the 1989 Coal Product Valuation Regulations, (ii) is
at variance with the MMS's consistent regulatory construction thereof,
and (iii) is contrary to administrative decisions which have been rendered by the MMS itself.77 As such, rather than the May 3, 1993
Dear Payor Letter explaining how the existing valuation regulations
apply, it can only be interpreted as mandating how the original
1989 Coal Product Valuation Regulations will now be applied. If this
is the case, the May 3, 1993, Dear Payor Letter must also be rejected
for failure to have complied with the Administrative Procedures Act.78
Again, the stakes are high. Even though the MMS has selected a
few oil and gas test cases to bring this issue before a United
States district court,79 it does not appear that it will be resolved in the
near future. To date, and with respect to federal coal audits, few contract settlements have resulted in an MMS Demand Letter and Bill for
Collection. Because the coal fact patterns are generally more favorable
than the oil and gas cases, the MMS has been reluctant to select any
coal test cases to bring the issue before a United States district court.
Depending upon a given coal operator's contract settlement issue, the
immediate decision to be made is whether one wants to be pro-active
and have a hand in the resolution of this issue or whether one wants
to adopt a passive position and hope to be the beneficiary of dicta
based upon someone else's more favorable fact pattern.
7. Miscellaneous Valuation Issues
Once one has run through the foregoing federal valuation issues,
the remaining issues are more mine specific and arise from the vaga-

(D.D.C. filed Aug. 13, 1993).
77. See Wolverine Exploration Co., MMS-88-0052-IND/MMS-88-0096-IND (May 2,
1990); Chevron U.S.A., Inc., MMS-RVS-O&G: 89-0467 (Nov. 30, 1989); ARCO Coal Company, MMS-RVS-SM: 89-0591 (July 7, 1989) and Blackwood & Nichols Co., Ltd., MMS88-008-O&G (Apr. 20, 1989).
78. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1989). See also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Johnson (Phillips
IV-Part 1), 22 F.3d 616 (5th Cir. 1994).
79. See Shell Offshore Inc., MMS-91-0087-OCS (1991); Samedan Oil Corporation,
MMS-94-0003-IND (1994).
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ries attendant to a particular operation. In such instances, the standard
against which these valuation issues will be resolved is pivotal; for
example, one might ask (i) whether payment or other consideration was
received "for" produced coal, or (ii) whether payment or other consideration was "in any way attributable to" the production of coal. As one
might suspect, the MMS has asserted the latter standard, with some
interesting results. While the results may not be unexpected, the MAMS
has asserted that coal consumed in a mine office stove is royalty bearing and that coal which has historically been made available to and
taken by the mine work force for its personal use is also royalty bearing.
Contractual payments and reimbursements are less obvious and,
sometimes, defy logic. The inherent fallacy in the MMS perception is
that not every payment provided for in a coal sales agreement is for
the purchase of coal. Some provisions relate to the business dealings or
the commercial relationship between the seller and the buyer, in which
the MMS has no vested interest.
By way of example, the MMS has asserted the following contractual payments and reimbursements to be royalty bearing:
(a) The payment of interest by the buyer is royalty bearing where
the operator/seller had paid increased royalty based upon a contract
price increase (e.g., decrease in the Federal depletion allowance, a
readjusted royalty increase from cents-per-ton to an ad valorem rate,
etc.) and the buyer's pass-through reimbursement is delayed or even
contested for several years. The MMS received its value for the produced coal when the operator/seller made the increased royalty payment, to possibly have included its own interest thereon. The ensuing
payment of contractual interest by the buyer is to compensate the operator/seller for its lost time value of money, thereby keeping the operator/seller whole. It has absolutely nothing to do with the value of the
produced coal. The produced coal is not worth more or less because of
the contractual interest provisions between the parties. In point of fact,
it is a private contractual/business matter solely between the operator/
seller and the buyer.
(b) The reimbursement of attorneys fees by the buyer is royalty
bearing where the fees were incurred by the operator/seller in the pros-
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ecution of an MMS appeal on behalf of the buyer. Pursuant to a passthrough clause in the coal sales agreement, the amount at risk in the
MMS appeal would be borne by the buyer. The operator/seller's attorneys fees were incurred by the buyer to protect its own monetary interest. The operator/seller was merely made whole. Such costs had
absolutely nothing to do with the value of the produced coal. If the
seller/buyer had decided to just pay the original MMS demand, that
payment would have constituted the value of the produced coal. That
same value was not increased because an appeal was pursued and attorneys fees were incurred. If the buyer could have prosecuted the appeal
and incurred the same fees from the buyer's own attorneys, would the
buyer's attorneys fees have been royalty bearing? If there had been no
pass-through clause and the operator/seller had incurred the same fees
for its own account, would the seller's attorneys fees have been royalty
bearing? If the seller/buyer had been upheld on appeal, would the
MMS be entitled to collect royalties on the same reimbursed attorneys
fees, even though the MMS had been reversed on appeal? In any one
of these three hypotheticals, was the "value of the produced coal"
actually increased? No, it is what it is.
(c) The reimbursement of "surety bond costs" by the buyer,
which were also incurred by the operator/seller in the prosecution of an
MMS appeal on behalf of the buyer, is royalty bearing. Again, the
amount at risk in the MMS appeal would be borne by the buyer. Either an appeal bond had to be posted or the MMS demand amount had
to be paid, in order to prosecute the appeal. The surety bond costs
were incurred by the buyer to protect its own monetary interest. The
operator/seller was simply made whole. Such costs had absolutely nothing to do with the value of the produced coal.
In each instance, it is submitted that the payment or reimbursement
should not be deemed to be royalty bearing, because it is not a component of value for the produced coal. But alas, we are back to the twopronged MMS thesis:
(1) Did the lessee receive a payment?
(2) Did the buyer pay for or contribute anything which is not
included in the purchase price?
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This standard is simply wrong!
B. MMS Administrative Appeal Procedures and Practice
There is surprisingly little law or regulation with respect to the
MMS's procedures and practice applicable to coal production royalties.
Other than the previously discussed FCLAA authorization for the Secretary to defme coal "value" by regulation, there are no specific statutory mandates which pertain to the MMS administration of coal royalty
audits, collection, or enforcement. Even with respect to regulatory
provisions, the subject coverage is not extensive, when contrasted with
the statutory and regulatory infrastructure attendant to oil and gas production royalties.8 "
The 1989 Coal Product Valuation Regulations do include provisions with respect to: (i) the quality and quantity measurement standards for reporting and paying royalties;"' (ii) the purview of an
MMS audit;82 (iii) requests for value determination; 3 (iv) the confidentiality of information;" and (v) MMS requests for contract submission.85 Except for the foregoing product valuation provisions of
Part 206, the remainder of the MMS Subchapter A-Royalty Management regulations86 provides only limited, general provisions which
would be applicable to coal, to include:
(a)
(b)
(c)

80.
Supp. V
81.
82.
83.

84.
85.
86.
87.
(1994).
88.
89.

forms and reports;87
records and files maintenance; 8
production accounting; 9

See Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act of 1982 (FOGRMA) (1988 and
1993), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1701-57. See also 30 C.F.R. pts. 201-282 (1994).
30 C.F.R. § 206.254 (1994).
30 C.F.R. § 206.257(b)(2) (1994).
Id. at § 206.257(f).

Id. at § 206.257(k).
30 C.F.R. § 206.263 (1994).
30 C.F.R. pts. 201-243.
See 30 C.F.R. pt. 210, subpt. E, Solid Minerals--General, §§ 210.200 to -.204
See 30 C.F.R. pt. 212, subpt. E, Solid Minerals-General, § 212.200 (1994).
See 30 C.F.R. pt. 216, subpt. A, General Provisions §§ 216.1 to -.40 (1994).
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coal audits;9"
collection of royalties, rentals, bonus and other monies due the
federal government,9' to also include late payments or underpayment charges (interest);92 and
audit delegation to states.93

Except for (i) pulling the foregoing regulatory provisions together
in one place, (ii) reiterating select 1989 Preamble excerpts, and
(iii) including examples, figures and forms of perceived application, the
AFS Payor Handbook, Solid Minerals, provides little further guidance
with respect to the MMS's substantive administration of royalty audits,
collection, or enforcement. Of specific applicability to this discussion,
the relatively new Chapter 10, Coal Product Valuation, dated October 26, 1992, should not be overlooked. Beyond this, there is not
much MMS policy which has been reduced to written form or which is
otherwise available to coal royalty payors.94 In essence, one must rely

upon empirical experience or acquiesce to the MMS's ad hoc directives, demands, and/or orders.
In the context of this dearth of substantive provisions, this section
will discuss the MMS appellate procedures and practice. It should not
come as a surprise that there is even less written either providing for
or discussing exactly those practices and procedures. The two primary
Manregulatory sources are (i) 30 C.F.R. Part 243, Appeals-Royalty
95 and (ii) Part 290, Appeals Procedures. 9 6
agement Program,

90. See 30 C.F.R. pt. 217, subpt. E, Coal, § 217.200 (1994).
91. See 30 C.F.R. pt. 218, subpt. A, General Provisions, §§ 218.10 to -.42 (1994).
92. See 30 C.F.R. pt. 218, subpt. E, Solid Minerals--General, § 218.202 (1994).
93. See 30 C.F.R. pt. 229, subpt. A, General Provisions, §§ 229.1 to -.10 (1994).
94. Under date of April 20, 1993, the MMS released "draf" proposed regulatory revisions to 30 C.F.R. pts. 206, 217 and 241, to include provisions with respect to the audit
process, record-keeping, access to information, audit completion, and administrative appeals.
To date, these draft revisions have not been published in the Federal Register as "proposed"
regulatory revisions and, purportedly, have been withdrawn by the MMS.
95. 30 C.F.R. §§ 243.1 to -.4 (1994).
96. 30 C.F.R. §§ 290.1 to -.7 (1994).
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1. Statute of Limitations
The federal statute of limitations provides that the United States
must bring an action for money damages which is founded upon "contract" within the later of (i) six years after the right of action accrues
or (ii) one year after a final decision has been rendered in the applicable administrative proceeding.97 Exceptions to this rule include: (i) if
the operator pays part of the MMS demand or acknowledges that the
demand is owed, the MMS right of action is renewed; (ii) the period
of limitation does not begin to run while facts material to the right of
action are not known or could not reasonably have been known; (iii) if
the operator files a suit against the United States, the statute does not
bar the MMS from filing a counterclaim if the claim arises out of the
same transaction or occurrence; and (iv) the statute does not preclude
the MMS from seeking to offset an unrelated claim against the
operator's claim.98
It has been held by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit in Phillips Il9 that this six year period begins to run
on the day that the payment was originally due. The court also held
that the statute of limitations does not begin to run upon completion of
an MMS audit and that the MMS's workload is not a cause to toll the
running of the statute of limitations.' 0 Conversely, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has recently held that as MMVIS
Demand Letters and Bills for Collection only seek monies due under a
contract, such contractual obligations cannot be considered compensatory and, therefore, are not subject to nor barred by the six year period.'0

97. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2415, 2416 (1988).
98. Id.
99. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Lujan (Phillips III), 4 F.3d 858 (10th Cir. 1993). See
also Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Lujan, 811 F.Supp. 1520 (N.D. Okla. 1992); Mesa Operating
Ltd. Part. v. United States Dept. of the Interior, 17 F.3d 1288 (10th Cir. 1994); 3M Co. v.
Browner, 17 F.3d 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
100. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Lujan, 4 F.3d 858 (10th Cir. 1993). See also Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Kelly, No. 3-89-CV1707-H (N.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 1992).
101. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Johnson (Phillips IV-Part 2), No. 93-1377, 1994 WL
484506 (5th Cir. Sept. 7, 1994).
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In the context of coal audits, finality is illusive. There always
seems to be another "adjustment" with the buyer, another form to be
submitted, or another payment to be made and, sometimes, relatively
long periods after the original due date for the subject payment. Often,
it seems that an audit closure letter is never forthcoming, but, rather,
one audit period and the next request for information simply roll into
one another.
Unfortunately, the MMS has been steadfast that the six year judicial statute of limitations is not applicable in administrative actions or
appeals.' This MMS position leads to the incongruity that while the
foregoing six-year limitation would be available to a lessee/operator as
an affirmative defense in a judicial proceeding, this judicial bar will
not be recognized by the MMS as an equivalent administrative bar.
Thus, the lessee/operator must exhaust its administrative remedies to be
able to assert this acknowledged judicial defense.
This mindset is symptomatic of the MMS's bureaucratic disdain
for the vested interests of the coal lessee/operator in the MMS appellate process.
2. Production of Documents
Similar to the uncertainty which attaches to the presence or absence of a statute of limitations with respect to administrative coal
demands, the parameters concerning the production of documents are
equally amorphous. The current federal coal lease form provides in
Section 6 that the "lessee shall keep open at all reasonable times for
the inspection of any duly authorized officer of lessor . . . all books,
accounts, maps, and records relative to operations ... .""' More specifically, under Subpart E (Solid Minerals-General) of 30 C.F.R.
Part 212 (Records and Files Maintenance), Section 212.200(a) provides
that all records must be maintained by a lessee "for [six] years after
the records are generated unless the record holder is notified, in writ-

102. See BHP Petroleum (Americas) Inc., 124 IBLA 185 (1992); Anadarko Petroleum
Corp., 122 IBLA 141 (1992); Foote Mineral Co., 34 IBLA 285 (1978).
103. BLM Form 3400-12 (Apr. 1984) (Federal Coal Lease).
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ing, that records must be maintained for a -longer period."'' 4 This section goes on to require that once an audit or investigation is underway,
records must be maintained until the record holder is released by written notice of the obligation to maintain the records. In terms of the
categories of records that are subject to production, Section 212.200(b)
simply provides that "the MMS shall have access to all records of the
operator/lessee pertaining to compliance with federal royalties."'0 °
This is certainly a pervasive requirement. As noted above with respect
to the application of the statute of limitations, audit closure is difficult
to achieve. Consequently, the audit-related obligation to continue to
maintain and/or to be required to produce records can extend well
beyond the original six-year period.
In practice, the MMS requirements for the maintenance and production of "records relevant to royalties" would include:
(a)
(b)

(c)
(d)

records must be kept for a minian operator's royalty-related
106
mum of six years;
if an operator elects to keep the records for longer than the
required six years, such "whiskered" records are also subject to
a request for production;'
the MMS may direct an operator to retain royalty-related records for longer than six years;' and
if the MMS has initiated an audit, all royalty-related records
must be kept until the MMS issues a release in the audit closure letter.0 9

To date, it has not been judicially decided whether the MMS can order
a coal operator to conduct a "self-audit" or to create new reports." 0

104. 30 C.F.R. § 212.200(a) (1994).
105. Id. at § 212.200(b).
106. Id. at § 212.200(a).
107. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Lujan (Phillips I), 951 F.2d 257, 260 (10th Cir.
1991).
108. 30 C.F.R. § 212.200(a) (1994). See also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Lujan (Phillips II), 963 F.2d 1380 (10th Cir. 1992).
109. 30 C.F.R. § 212.200(2) (1994).
110. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Kelly, Civ. Act. No. 3-89-CV-1707-H (N.D. Tex.
Sept. 18, 1992) (holding that under FOGRMA, the MMS can require the operator to conduct "self-audits").
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Unlike the FOGRMA statutory authority,"l l the MMS does not
have subpoena power with respect to the records of a federal coal
lessee/operator.
3. Requests for Value Determination
Once it becomes apparent that a sticky valuation issue is developing, and again contingent upon magnitude of exposure and "policy"
precedent involved, a lessee/operator may want to consider the submission of a Request for Value Determination."' In so doing, it may be
possible to avoid the purported resolution of the issue during the audit
process, where policy level considerations are precluded. Then too,
running the audit gauntlet can easily take a couple of floundering
years, between the conduct of the audit itself, the subsequent requests
for information, the MMS Issues Letter, the operator's response thereto,
and the eventual Demand Letter and Bill for Collection, which would
be the first administratively appealable decision.
Rather, a lessee/operator may request a value determination from
the MS."' In so doing, the lessee/operator proposes a value determination method and submits the data that it believes is relevant to its
proposal. Because the regulation expressly requires that the MMS must
"expeditiously" render its value determination, 4 this process would
significantly reduce the delay factor.
Another benefit from the resolution of valuation issues through
value determination is the fact that this MMS decision would be appealable. "5 Depending on the nature of the valuation issue, the Request for Value Determination might be addressed to the MMS Director, with a specific request that the decision be rendered as a full force
and effect order at the secretarial level, thereby permitting the lessee/

111. 30 U.S.C. § 1717 (1988). See also United States v. Sampson Resources Co.,
No. 92-C-1030 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 13, 1993).
112. 30 C.F.R. § 206.257(f) (1994).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. 30 C.F.R. §290.2 (1994).
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operator to proceed directly to United States district court if the determination is adverse.16
A Request for Value Determination is not suited to the resolution
of all valuation issues. However, within certain parameters, it does
provide a pro-active vehicle for policy level determinations on an expedited basis.
4. MMS/State Audits
The 1989 Coal Product Valuation Regulations define an "audit" as
"a review, conducted in accordance with generally accepted accounting
and auditing standards, of royalty payment compliance activities of
lessees . ... ' Interestingly, Section 217.200, within Subpart E (Audits and Inspections), provides the only direct and current regulatory
provision for the conduct of coal audits. That section provides, in
part, that coal audits may be required annually or as directed by the
Associate Director for Royalty Management and "shall be performed
by a qualified independent certified public accountant or by an independent public accountant . . . and at the expense of the operator/
lessee.. '".
Based upon the express provisions of Section 217.200, one might
wonder whether the MMS or a state auditor is even authorized to conduct its own on-site audit? Unfortunately, such a prohibition does not
follow. In its 1990 Arch Mineral decision," 9 the Tenth Circuit noted
that under the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920, the Secretary is
"authorized to prescribe necessary and proper rules and regulations and
to do any and all things necessary to carry out and accomplish the
purposes of this Chapter. . ,.' Based thereon, the court held such
language to be "a broad grant of authority." The court further held that

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

30 C.F.R. § 243.3 (1994).
30 C.F.R. § 206.251 (1994).
30 C.F.R. § 217.200 (1994).
Arch Mineral Corp. v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 408 (10th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 415. See also 30 U.S.C. § 189 (1979).
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"the collection
of royalties and rents is certainly one of the purposes of
21

the Act."

'1

In practice, the MMS or state auditors do conduct their own onsite audits. More specifically, the MMS has entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the respective states, 122 so that coal audits
are now conducted primarily by state auditors. However, the state auditors are not authorized to make policy or interpretative decisions; this
function is solely reserved to the MMS.
The audit process is initiated by an "audit engagement letter." It
usually befalls an oil and gas auditor to conduct the coal audit, or, at
least, it is usually conducted by someone who has little experience
within the coal industry. The consequence is that oil and gas concepts
are visited upon the coal audit, and the nuances of the coal industry
and the realities of coal marketplace are lost. In addition, the auditors
have little or no authority to make independent decisions and no incentive to be other than excessively aggressive.
The upshot is that most coal audits leave the lessee/operator frustrated, and the prospects for an ensuing audit appeal are all but predestined. This is unfortunate, because the majority of audit issues should
be resolved at the audit level.
5. MMS "Issues Letter"
There is no regulatory requirement for the MMS to submit an
"Issues Letter" to the lessee/operator. However, if the audit does indicate that additional royalty may be owing, the MMS will prepare an
Issues Letter or a "preliminary findings letter," which will inform the
lessee/operator of the MMS's preliminary determinations and the basis
for its conclusions, and will request the operator's response thereto.
While mistrust and/or skepticism prevent some operators from responding, it is suggested that every opportunity should be taken to resolve
such issues before the MMS position becomes unduly rigid. Depending
upon the magnitude of the audit issues, direct meetings with the MMS

121. Arch Mineral Corp., 911 F.2d at 415.
122. 30 C.F.R. §§ 229.1 to -.10 (1994).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1995

35

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 97, Iss. 4 [1995], Art. 4

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:887

are recommended, as many as necessary and at successively higher
levels, as is the written submission of the lessee/operator's legal position.
The optimist will observe that there is little to lose by responding
forcefully to an MMS Issues Letter, because if one does not, the MMS
will issue its Demand Letter and Bill for Collection premised upon the
position stated in the Issues Letter. The pessimist's rejoinder would be
that the lessee/operator's response will only afford the MMS the opportunity to tighten-up or redefine its original determination. In this
manner, because the basis for the MMS demand may not have been
substantiated very well at this initial juncture, it would be more susceptible to a successful challenge upon higher review. Overall, a proactive approach is recommended; if not, one can almost insure the
worst. Then too, once an MMS position has been immortalized in a
Demand Letter and Bill for Collection, it is significantly harder to
reverse it, because someone will have to admit that he was wrong, and
human nature resists such candor.
6. MMS Decision (Demand Letter) or Order
In the audit context, at some indeterminate point after (i) the conclusion of the audit, (ii) the issuance of the MIMS Issues Letter, and
(iii) the lessee/operator's response thereto, as well as prospective information requests and meetings, the MMS will issue a Demand Letter
and Bill for Collection. This MMS Demand Letter constitutes the first
audit decision that is subject to administrative appeal.'23 Section 290.2
provides that "any party to a case adversely affected by a final order
or decision of an officer of the [M S] shall have a right to appeal to
the Director, [MMS]. . . ." The determination of who constitutes an
"adversely affected party" is subjective and is to be decided on a case
by case basis."2 4

123. 30 C.F.R. § 290.2 (1994).
124. See Solicitor's Opinion, Whether States May Appeal MMS Royalty Value Determinations (Nov. 13, 1985); Dvorak Expedition, 127 IBLA 145 (Aug. 25, 1993); National
Wildlife Federation, 129 IBLA 124 (Apr. 13, 1993); State of Wyoming, 117 IBLA 316
(Jan. 24, 1991).
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If the lessee/operator agrees with the Demand Letter and the demand amount as recited in the Bill for Collection, the only requisite
step is to tender payment in accordance with the Bill for Collection.
If one does not agree with either the Demand Letter or the amount
stated in the Bill for Collection, to avoid being bound thereby, an
appeal to the MMS Director must be filed. The Notice of Appeal must
be filed within thirty days from receipt of the Demand Letter,125 by
filing the notice with the office of the MMS official who issued the
decision or order. 6 If the decision or order was issued by the Assistant Secretary for Land and Minerals Management or by the Secretary,
27
one's administrative remedies are deemed to have been exhausted,
and further challenge is directly to United States district court.
Of all of the MMS procedures, only this thirty-day period within
which to file a Notice of Appeal is mandatory,' subject to a graceperiod exception.'29 If the lessee/operator is going to file an appeal, it
is strongly advised that the Notice of Appeal be submitted safely within the designated thirty-day appeal period. There is no specific format
for this notice. If the operator/lessee fails to timely file a Notice of
Appeal, it is bound by the MMS Demand Letter/Bill for Collection or
other order.
By a Notice published March 16, 1994, the authority of the MMS
Appeals Division was delegated to the MMS Royalty Management
Program (RMP) to render decisions on "routine appeals" from decision
and orders that are issued by the RMP.130 The stated purpose of this
delegation was to streamline the appeals process and to reduce the time
for a final agency decision. Such routine appeals are defined as:
(a)

125.
126.
127.
128.
man, Jr.,
129.
130.
131.

Appeals not timely filed as required by MMS regulations."'

30 C.F.R. §§ 243.4(c),(d) (1994).
30 C.F.R. § 290.3 (1994).
30 C.F.R. § 243.3 (1994).
30 C.F.R. §§ 290.3(a)(1),(2) and 290.5(a) (1994). See also Walter Van Nor114 IBLA 56 (1990); Conoco, Inc., 115 IBLA 105 (1990).
30 C.F.R. § 290.5(b) (1994).
59 Fed. Reg. 12342 (1994).
See 30 C.F.R. § 290.3 (1994).
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(b)

Appeals from an assessment for a required report filed late.'

(c)

Appeals
from an assessment for failure to file a required re133
port.

(d)

Appeals
from an assessment for an incorrectly completed re134
port.

(e)

(f)

Appeals from an assessment of interest for unpaid and underpaid amounts due. 135 This category is limited to factual issues
involving the time value of money and non-precedent-setting
appeals. Appeals with complex issues will be referred to the
Director of MMS for a decision.
Appeals in which the appellant neglects to file a statement of
reasons
to justify modification of the RMP order or deci36
sion.

(g)

Appeals in which the order or decision is being rescinded.'37

It is anticipated that this procedure will result in the summary denial
of such routine cases, thereby hurdling the MMS administrative appeal
process and, if desired, permitting the appellant to proceed directly to
the IBLA.
7. MMS Appeals
Reference to the MMS appeal procedures and practice as an appellate process is a misnomer. Rather, the MMS appeal process is a
four-stage exercise in the confirmation of MMS "policy." This process
consists of the issuance of the MMS (i) Issues Letter, (ii) Demand
Letter/Bill for Collection, (iii) Field Report, and (iv) Appeal Decision.
Through the first three stages, the MMS action is somewhat understandable, as the MMS is acting as an advocate for its evolving valuation policy. It is almost to be expected because, as previously noted,
specific statutory pronouncement is minimal and the regulatory provisions are skeletal.

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

30
30
30
30
59
Id.

C.F.R. §§
C.F.R. §§
C.F.R. §§
C.F.R. §§
Fed. Reg.

216.40, 218.40 (1994).
215.40, 218.40 (1994).
216.40, 218.40 (1994).
218.54, 218.102, 218.150, 218.202, 218.302 (1994).
12342 (1994).
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The real exposition is reflected by the fourth stage, or the actual
MMS Appeal Decision. One would anticipate that the MMS Appeals
(and Litigation Support) Division would be at least quasi-independent
and function with some degree of judicial temperament. Alas, this is
not the case. While a draft decision is, indeed, prepared by the MMS
Appeals Division, the decision is then "surnamed." Surnaming entails
the routing of the draft decision for review and approval (i) to the
very office that rendered the original decision or order, (ii) to the Office of Policy and Management Improvement, (iii) to the Solicitor's
office, and (iv) to the Director's office. It is accepted that the
Solicitor's office has a veto power over the issuance of the MMS Appeal Decision, unless overruled by the Director. This is the same
Solicitor's office that will act as the advocate for the MMS before the
IBLA or in United States district court. In this way, the MMS assures
that its policy is consistent or evolving in the manner espoused by the
MMS itself. The galling part is that these same MMS Appeal Decisions are subsequently cited as authority or precedent for the validity
of a given MMS policy.
The foregoing is the "appellate" course of action if the MMS
knows what "policy" it desires to "confirm." If the policy does not
currently exist or is still subject to internal determination, an MMS
Appeal Decision will not be rendered, and the case will be stalled until
the policy is confirmed. For these reasons, some appeals have been at
issue before the MMS Appeals Division since 1986-1987. It is also
accepted that if a given case fact pattern is not favorable to the MMS
policy to be confirmed, the case will be stalled until a more favorable
fact pattern is presented; then, the second case will be cited as precedent in deciding the stalled case. A delay in excess of two years is
commonplace in rendering MMS Appeal Decisions.
This inordinate delay is exacerbated by the MMS's promulgation
on March 29, 1994, effective April 1, 1994, of revised interest rate
regulations for solid minerals pursuant to 30 C.F.R. Sections 218.202 (c) and (d).138 Prior to this revision, the interest rate on late payments
or underpayments for solid minerals, to include coal, was premised

138.

59 Fed. Reg. 14557 (1994).
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upon the "Treasury Current Value of Funds Rate" as published by the
Department of the Treasury 3 9 and was computed as simple interest.
The revised regulation now provides that the interest rate for solid
minerals is the "underpayment rate established by Section 6621(a)(2) of
the Internal Revenue Code,"' 40 with the attendant policy assertion by
the MMS that the interest is to be compounded. The net effect is that
the coal interest rate increased from 3% to 7% on April 1, 1994, to
8% on July 1, 1994, and to 9% on October 1, 1994. 1 ' For late payments or underpayments which straddle April 1, 1994, the MMS has
declared by way of Preamble "example" that the prior simple interest
will be added to the original principal, and that the new compounded
interest rate is applicable to that combined principal/simple interest
amount. 42 One would think that simple interest is simple interest and
that the compounded interest could be computed only against the original principal from and after April 1, 1994. This is yet another example
of the AM S endeavoring to FOGRMA-tize the coal industry. While
this redesignation from the Treasury Rate to the IRS Rate, to include
the purported compounding thereof, is subject to administrative appeal,
it has not yet been judicially decided.
Because of the four to five year administrative delay before the
MMS and the IBLA, and because of an overall delay of six to seven
years before a decision is rendered by a United States district court, it
was not uncommon that the amount of interest owed would exceed the
original principal. Now, with the advent of higher and purportedly
compounded interest, consideration should be given to paying the demanded principal "under protest," in order to stop the interest hemorrhage. In each appeal, a time value of money standard should be applied. Unfortunately, if the lessee/appellant prevails in whole or in part
on appeal, the lvMS will not pay interest on its time value use of the
4
lessee/appellant's money. 1

139. 30 C.F.R. §§ 218.202(c)-(d) (1994).
140. 30 C.F.R. § 218.202(c) (1994); 26 U.S.C. §6621(a)(2) (1988 and Supp. V 1993).
141. See MMS Summary of the OCS, Onshore, and Solid Mineral Interest Rates, which
have been in effect from December, 1979, through the present.
142. 59 Fed. Reg. 14557, 14558 (1994).
143. 30 C.F.R. § 243.2(a) (1994).
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Within the foregoing context, the coal lessee/operator must prosecute its MIVIMS "appeal," in order to exhaust this "administrative remedy" and proceed to file a subsequent administrative appeal before the
IBLA, which is the alter ego of the Secretary. Both administrative
remedies must be exhausted before one can1 44raise the merits of the
challenge before a United States district court.
In the prosecution of an MMS "appeal," Section 243.2(a) provides
for the suspension of monetary-demand decisions or orders upon the
submission of an MMS approved surety instrument. 145 Such a surety
instrument will include the principal amount owed, plus any accrued
interest, and the projected interest for a one-year period.146 The surety
amount is amended annually to cover the additional estimated interest
147
for another one-year period.
Although the appellant is to file its Statement of Reasons either
with its Notice of Appeal or within the same thirty-day appeal period, 14 1 the common practice was to request in the Notice of Appeal a
thirty or sixty-day extension to file the Statement of Reasons. In turn,
Section 290.3(b) states that the officer with whom the appeal is filed is
to transmit the appeal and accompanying papers to the MMS Director
(MMS Appeals Division), with a fall report (MMS Field Report) and
his recommendations on the appeal. 149 No time requirements are imposed upon the MMS to transmit the appeal and its Field Report, and
this step usually took from six to eighteen months.
More recently, the MMS issued an August 3, 1993, Dear Payor
Letter, which announced that the MMS had identified a number of
improvements to the appeals process, to include: (i) permitting appellant sixty days from receipt of the decision or order to file its Statement of Reasons, with time extensions being granted only upon a

144. Id. at § 243.3.
145. Id. While the usual form of surety instrument is a surety bond, a certificate of
deposit or Treasury bill may also be posted, with the interest earned accruing to the lessee/

operator.
146. 30 C.F.R. § 243.2(c)(1) (1994).

147. Id. at § 243.2(c)(2).
148. 30 C.F.R. § 290.3(a)(1) (1994).
149. Id. at § 290.3(b).
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showing of good cause; 5 ' (ii) establishing internal MMS time frames
for the preparation of the MMS Field Report, without the disclosure of
such internal time frames; and (iii) allowing appellant only twenty-one
days from the date of the letter transmitting the MMS Field Report to
file a "response" thereto.'' While this August 3, 1993, Dear Payor
Letter recites that the foregoing and other recommendations would be
implemented "in the near future," such implementation has only been
accomplished internally within the MMS. In effect, the implementation
of these "improvements" has been by directive in MMS correspondence
to the lessee/appellant. Thus, the historic procedural rights of the lessee/appellant and the practice before the MMS Appeals Division were
markedly changed by the unceremonial issuance of the August 3, 1993,
Dear Payor Letter.
While Section 290.4 provides that oral argument will be allowed
on motion in the discretion of the MMS Director (MMS Appeals Division), oral argument is not part of the practice before the MMS Appeals Division.
Beyond the foregoing, very little is specifically provided, and one
must rely upon empirical experience. In effect, one should be pro-active at each stage, even after the Statement of Reasons and/or Response
to the MMS Field Report have been filed. If a settlement can be
reached at any juncture, it merely remains to withdraw the pending
appeal.
8. Expediting Appeals Before the MMS Appeals Division
Before an appeal is actually filed with the MMS Appeals Division,
a pro-active role can facilitate the resolution of the claim, thus obviating the necessity to file an appeal. Depending upon the issues and

150. If a request for extension of time to file a Statement of Reasons is to be submitted, it must be filed within the first 30 days after the decision or order is received, or
within the 30-day notice of appeal period. Normally, the request for extension is submitted
with and included in the notice of appeal. In cases involving complex issues, an additional
30-day extension is commonly granted.
151. See app. 4, MMS Dear Payor Letter dated August 3, 1993, regarding "improvements to the appeals process."
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precedential or monetary impact, the coal lessee/operator may request
that the decision or order be issued as a "full force and effect" order
at the Secretarial level, thereby permitting the lessee/operator to proceed directly to United States district court. 152 Currently, the MMS is
considering the designation of a limited number of test cases, so that
select valuation issues may be resolved more quickly.
However, once an appeal has been filed with the MMS Appeals
Division, there is little that the appellant can do to expedite the actual
processing thereof. While there is no specific procedure for such, there
would be nothing to prevent an appellant from submitting a motion for
expedited consideration. This would be a request for extraordinary
relief at the MMS Appeals Division level, and the attendant burden in
presenting a basis for the motion is likely to be equally high.
As discussed briefly above, the MMS did identify a number of
improvements in its August 3, 1993, Dear Payor Letter which were
intended to reduce the current appeals processing delay.'53 These improvements include:
(a)
(b)

(c)

requiring the appellant to file its Statement of Reasons within
sixty days from receipt of the MMS decision or order;
requiring the responsible MMS office to simultaneously send its
Field54Report to the MMS Appeals Division and to the appellant;
requiring the appellant to file a Response to the MMS Field
Report "within 21 days of the5 date of the letter transmitting the
field report to the appellant;"'

152. 30 C.F.R. § 243.3 (1994).
153. See app. 4, MMS Dear Payor Letter dated August 3, 1993, regarding "improvements to the appeals process."
154. Previously, the MMS Field Report was only sent to the MMS Appeals Division,
which would forward a copy to the appellant. In the past, it could be anywhere from six to
eighteen months before the appellant would receive a copy of the MMS Field Report.
155. This time sequence is totally inadequate. It is common for correspondence from
the MMS Appeals Division to be dated upwards to a week earlier than it is actually postmarked (presumably, awaiting mailing; the MMS maintains that its correspondence is not
dated until after it has been signed). Then too, the delivery of correspondence from the
MMS Appeals Division seems to travel by a slow boat, taking upwards to another week for
delivery. While 21 days is a relatively short time frame to begin with, it certainly should
not begin to run until the copy of the MMS Field Report is received by the appellant and
should be subject to extension for good cause shown. The prior rule of thumb was that the
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establishing internal MMS time frames for each phase of the
appeals process; 56
establishing a new MMS automated appeals tracking system to
consolidate the various systems currently being used throughout
the MMS to record and monitor appeals cases; and
designating an appeals coordinator in each MMS operating division to facilitate inquiries by the appellant.

This August 3, 1993, Dear Payor Letter recites that "most of these
near term initiatives are in the process of implementation and will take
effect on September 1, 1993.";' To date, nothing further has been
publicly released to this effect. Rather, it can only be assumed that the
MMS has, in fact, internally implemented the foregoing procedures,
presumably effective September 1, 1993.
Looked at with a different spin, the MMS appeals processing system is broken, and something needs to be fixed. The existence of a
dual administrative appeal system between the MMS and the IBLA
cannot be justified. It is not at all uncommon for it to take more than
four to five years to exhaust these administrative remedies. At the end,
it is usually the appellant who is exhausted. This fact was recognized
and studied by the MMS in 1993, and resulted in the issuance of a
report concerning the implementation of an "Alternate Dispute Resolution Program."' 58 In conjunction therewith, a joint Appeals/Alternative
Dispute Resolution Work Group, being comprised of MMS, state, Indian and mineral industry representatives, has been constituted to further
review prospective alternatives to "fix" the appeals process.

appellant had 30 days from receipt of the MMS Field Report to submit its Response, and
extensions were common.
156. Such internal time frames are not specified, which prevents the appellant from
planning or anticipating accordingly, and reflect the uneven level of the playing field. While
the MMS is motivated by its own schedules and workload, it somehow presumes that the
appellant is not equally occupied with the conduct of operations and the realities of the coal
business. It would seem that both parties should be on the same rigid or elastic leash.
157. See app. 3.
158. Final Report, MMS Alternate Dispute Resolution Program, March, 1994.
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9. Dispute Resolution Through the MMS Office of Enforcement
A true trace of sanity in this process is the MMS Office of Enforcement.'59 While the name is somewhat misleading, once an appeal
has been filed, the MMS Office of Enforcement is empowered to cut
through what might otherwise constitute bureaucratic red-tape, discuss
the merits of an MMS claim, and, prospectively, enter into a settlement
agreement with respect thereto.
This does not mean that all MMS claims are even susceptible to
settlement. However, it does provide a forum where both the regulatory
and business aspects of an MMS claim can be evaluated and, if appropriate, settled. There is no downside to being pro-active. It can be a
win-win situation and save a great deal of cost and frustration in the
process. As all such settlements are forwarded to the MMS Director
for approval and execution of the actual Settlement Agreement, the
footing for any such settlement is firm.
If a settlement is reached, it merely remains to withdraw the pending appeal after the Settlement Agreement has been executed.
10. MMS Settlement Agreements
In due course, it can only be hoped that a greater number of
MMS claims can be settled, rather than having to ran the appeals
gauntlet, so that everyone can get back to more productive matters. If
a settlement is reached at any stage in the appeal process, a Settlement
Agreement can be prepared by either the MMS or the appellant. It is
usually appreciated if the appellant is willing to prepare a "fair" initial
draft for review by the MMS, presumably by the MMS Office of Enforcement or by the Solicitor's office.
In so doing, the KISS philosophy is strongly encouraged. One
need only recite the appropriate chain of documentation as respective
"Whereas" clauses and include the substantive terms of the settlement.

159. This office is located in Building 85, Federal Center, Denver, Colorado, 80215,

(303) 231-3749.
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If a payment is to be made, it is recommended that one negotiate and
include a provision that the appellant will not be required to undertake
a "restructured accounting."
IV. CONCLUSION

The MMS has embarked upon an aggressive coal royalty valuation
odyssey, for which there is no common law nor mandated statutory
basis. Accordingly, any form of deference to MMS interpretations,
policy pronouncements and even regulatory rulemaking is tantamount
to feeding steroids to King Kong. The coal industry must be vigilant
first and pro-active second. The stark issue is "what we will yet permit
the Federal Coal Product Valuation Program to become?"
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V. APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

MMS(USGS)/BLM COAL VALUATION REGULATIONS

JSGSI

BLM

FORM/C.F.R. CITE

-FED.
- REG.
CITE

USGS Operating Regulations to Govern Coal-Mining Methods and the Safety and Welfare of Miners
on Leased Lands on the
Public Domain

Third
Printing
1968

04/30/73

Proposed Coal Mining
Operating rules/§ 211.61

38 FR
10686

09/05/75

Proposed Coal Mining
Operating rules/§ 211.61

40 FR
41122

05/17/76

Final Coal Mining Operating rules/§ 211.63

41 FR
20252

MMS
1968

FCLAA ENACTED-AuGUST 4, 1976
01/25/77

Revised post-FCLAA rules/
§ 3503.3-3

42 FR
4452

03/19/79

Proposed Coal Management
Program rules/§ 3473.3-2

44 FR
16800
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USGSi

I
I

-BLM

FORM/C.F.R. CITE
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FED.

MISREG.
_
07/19/79

___.._CITE
FINAL COAL MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM RULES/§ 3473.3-

44 FR
42584

2
12/16/81

12/16/81

07/30/82

Proposed Coal Exploration
and Mining Operations
rules/§ 211.63

46 FR
61424

Proposed amended Coal
Management Program rules/
§ 3473.3-2

46 FR
61390

FINAL COAL EXPLORATION

47 FR
33154

AND MINING OPERATIONS

RULES/§ 211.63

07/30/82

Final amended Coal Management Program rules/

47 FR
33114

§ 3473.3-2
08/05/83
09/16/83

Redesignated § 211.63 to
§ 203.200

48 FR
35642

Redesignated § 211.63 to
§ 3485.2

48 FR
41589

12/05/83

Draft proposed Coal Royalty Valuation rules/§ 206.200

01/27/86

Draft proposed Coal Royalty Valuation rules/§
206.250

01/15/87

Proposed Coal Product
Valuation rules/§ 206.250
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USGS/
MMS

BLM

FORMI/CF.R. CITE

FED.
CITE

_EG.__

01/15/88

Redesignated § 203.200 to
§ 203.250

05/20/88

Bootleg draft Coal Product
Valuation rules/§ 206.250

07/15/88

Re-proposed Coal Product
Valuation rules/§ 206.250

53 FR
26942

01/13/89

FINAL COAL PRODUCT
VALUATION RULES/§
206.250

54 FR
1492

02/13/90

Proposed Withdrawal of
"Exclusions" rule/§ 206.257
(b)(5)

55 FR
5024

08/30/90

FINAL WITHDRAWAL OF
"EXCLUSIONS" RULE/
§ 206.257(b)(5)

55 FR
35427
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Federal Rcgistcr / Vol. 54. No. 9 / Friday. Junuary 13. 1Cn9 / Rules and Re;ulations

1513

,.MMS
cannbt include In this rulemaking
comprehensive criteria which could be
considered in deciding whether a lessee
has met its burden to demonstrate a
particular payment Isnot royalty
Comment. Paragraph [b) (6)
of the
earing. However. MMS will certainly
proposed rule provided that the royalty
consider such factors as the terms of the
value would not include payments
sales contract. the lessee's rationale for
received by a lessee pursuant to Its
Its claim that the payment Is not part of
contract If the lessee demonstrates to
the value of production. how the
)4MS'a satisfaction, that such payments
purchaser characterizes the transaction
were not part of the total consideration
(particularly If ItIs a public utility
paid for the purchase of coal.
subject to state public utilities
Most comments received by MMS
commission regulation), and any other
were addressed earlier in the general
relevant matters. Otherfactors could
-comment response to M.MS's position
include the following:
with respect to take-or.pay and similar
2. The unit sale or contract price.
type payments. However. one comment
Including prices that explicitly vary with
raissed particular issues that require
the
level of production, are considered
separate responses here. The commenter royalty
bearing.
stated that the proposed regulation, as
2. Payments not designated as part of
worded, appears to defeat judicial
the purchase price, but made on a
review because the demonstration (that
periodic or regularly scheduled basis.
&payment is not royalty bearing) is "to
generally
are royalty bearing.
MMS's satisfaction." instead of an
3. "Settlement" payments made to
objective finding of facL The commenter
terminate a sales contract before the
concluded that "Royalty determinations
contractually.specified termination date
are subject to judicial review under the
Administrative Procedure Act as actions will usually not be considered payment
that have not been committed to agency for produced coal. Ifthere is a follow.on
contract. MMS will review the
discretion by law. and hMS cannot
circumstances to determine Ifsome or
adopt an un:eviewable standard in the
all or the payment s royalty bearing.
face of this congressional mandate for
4. Payments or reimbursements for
review."
services
or processing costs customarily
AWMS Response:There Isno attempt
the responsibility of the lessee. Including
to circumvent the requirements of The
that required to put the product in
Administrative Procedure ACL The
marketable condition, will usually be
M S decisions generally are subject to
considered payment for produced coal.
the administrative appeal process.
5. Damages recovered under a court
Adverse decisions may ultimately be
Judgment or Included In a liquidated
taken to the Federal court system for
damages clause, that are for the
relief.
The ,IS has adopted this paragraph purchaser's breach of a sales contract
(b](b) as proposed. Under this section.
are usually not considered payment for
there is a presumptort that payments
produced coal. ifthey correspond to or
are a reasonable estimate of the
received by the lessee from its
producer's lost profiLt.
purchaser are payments for coal
production. The lessee can rebut that
The provisions of paragraph (bj(6) will
presumption,. but the burden is on the
not be applicable to any types of
payments which other sections of the
essee tocome forward with the
justification for its position that the
rules expressly Include as part of the
payment was not for coal production.
royalty value, such as payments for the
The MhMS always has had a consistent
costs of placing production In
policy that royalty is due on no less than marketable condition.

the lcssee's gross proceeds, which
Includes all
payments for p:oduc':ion.
Heretofore, that policy resulted in
royalty demands on vfrtually all
payments from the purchaser to the
seller. However. payments must Indeed
be payments for coal production before
any royalty Is owed. Therefore, lessees
will have the opportunity to come
forward with arguments as to why a
particular payment under a coal sales
contract Is not part of the value of the
coal production.
Because there are so many different
types of coal sales contract clauses.
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United States Department of the Interior

___'

MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE

Royalty Management Program
P.O. Box 25165
Denver. Colorado 80225.0165

MMS-VSD-OG
Hail Stop 3922

MAY 0 3 1993

Dear Payor:
The Minerals Management Service's (MMS) product valuation regulations always
have required that royalty be paid on a value which cannot be less than the
'gross proceeds' accruing to the lessee for the disposition of minerals
roduced from Federal or Indian leases.' During the past several years, many
essees have entered into agreements with their purchasers settling various
issues pertaining to the sale of production from Federal and Indian leases
which have arisen under their contracts. These settlements frequently involve
a lump-sum payment by the purchaser to be relieved of some or all of Its
obligations under the sales contract.
The purpose of this letter is to provide 1MS Royalty Management Program (RHP)
interpretation of how the various gross proceeds regulations apply to monies
received under contract settlements. The RMP interpretation clarifies that
lessees and other payors are required to pay royalties on contract settlement
payments to the extent payments are attfibutable to minerals produced from the
lease. Under this interpretation, some or all of a settlement payment is or
will become royalty bearing if production to which specific money is
attributable occurs.
Enclosure I is an explanation of how RMP's interpretation applies to payments
made with respect to four issues or elements that are commonly the subject of
contract settlement agreements, specifically:
1. Past pricing disputes;
2. Accrued
*3.
Contract take-or-pay
"buydowns;' liabilities;
and
4. Contract 'buyouts."
If settlement payments pertain to other elements not specifically addressed in
Enclosure 1, or if payments are received as a consequence of Judicial
litigation regarding sales contract obligations,, the payments will be examined
using principles consistent with those set forth in Enclosure 1.

1 See former M*S regulations at 30 CFR §§ 203.200 (1987) (coal, gross
value), 206.103 (1987) (onshore oil and gas), 206.150 (1987) (offshore oil and
gas), 206.300 (1987) (geothermal, total consideration), and current regulations
at 30 CFR §§ 206.102 (oil), 206.152 (unprocessed gas), 206.153 (processed gas),
206.257 (coal), 206.352, 206.355, and 206.356 (geoihermal) (1992).
APPENDIX 3
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2
Enclosure 2 contains examples illustrating how RMP's interpretation applies to
comoon types of contract settlement payment situations. These illustrations
are not meant to be exhaustive; they simply highlight the key elements of the
interpretation. The royalty consequences discussed in each of the'examples
apply only to the specific hypothetical given.
The enclosed RMP interpretation and examples do not address the issue of how
lump-sum contract settlement payments are to be allocated among the several
elements that are the subject of the settlement agreement between the seller
and the purchaser, which is a necessary. prerequisite to applying the
interpretation set forth in Enclosure 1. In calculating royalties due on a
contract settlement payment, payors need to allocate portions of the
settlement payment to each issue resolved in the agreement; e.g., past pricing
disputes, take-or-pay, buyout, and buydown. This should be based on the
settlement agreement itself, or supporting documents used in the settlement
negotiations, if such documents are available and if the allocation reflected
in them is reasonable. In reviewing the reasonableness of a payor's
allocations, RMP will apply its experience thus far derived from reviewing a
substantial number of settlements. That experience has been that for past
pricing disputes, the settlement has been for a high proportion of the.accrued
liabilities for that element. For take-or-pay, the settlement has reflected a
small proportion of the take-or-pay liability accrued under the original
contract. If RMP determines that the parties' allocation is unreasonable, RMP
will determine an appropriate allocation.
The RMP will request from lessees, other royalty payors, and purchasers
information regarding contract settlements related to Federal and Indian
leases. The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Oklahoma recently affirmed MMS' right to examine all such information in
United States v. Samson Resources Co., Civil No. 92-C-1030 B (March 19, 1993).
Lessees and other royalty payors should use this interpretation to determine
the royalties due on amounts received under contract settlement agreements.
Royalties due should be reported on the Report of Sales and Royalty
Remittance, Form MMS-2014, according to the instructions given in Enclosure 3.
If you have further questions regarding this interpretation of the
regulations, please contact Mr. Martin C. Grieshaber at (303) 275-7240. If
you have questions concerning the conduct of audits using this interpretation,
please contact Mr. Kenneth H. Moyers at (303) 231-5129 or (303) 231-3185.
Sincerely,

4'mes W. Shaw
tsociate Director for
Royalty Management

3 Enclosures
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Enclosure 1
The Minerals Management Service (MMS)
Royalty Management Program (RMP) Interpretation on
Royalty Liability on Contract Settlement Payments
GENERAL PRINCIPLE

For Federal and Indian leases, royalties are due on payments received under
.contract settlement agreements to the extent the payments are attributable to
production from the lease. In Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co. v. Hodel,
853 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1988), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
ruled that royalties are not due on take-or-pay payments until the production
to which the take-or-pay payment is attributable. (under the Court's holding,
so-called 'make-up' gas) occurs.
Consistent with that ruling, the RMP interpretation and policy isthat a
payment or a portion of a payment is royalty bearing ifthe mineral to which
the payment is attributable isproduced and sold either to the original
purchaser or a substitute purchaser, as part of the 'gross proceedso received
for disposition of that production under applicable regulations. (See former
MMS regulations at 30 CFR §§ 203.200 (1987) (coal, gross value), 206.103
(1987) (onshore oil and gas), 206.150 (1987) (offshore oil and gas), 206.300
(1987) (geothermal, total consideration), and current regulations at
30 CFR §§ 206.102 (oil), 206.152 (unprocessed gas), 206.153 (processed gas),
206.257 (coal), 206.352, 206.355, and 206.356 (geothermal) (1992).
SPECIFIC APPLICATION TO ELEMENTS OF CONTRACT SETLEMENT PAYMENTS
PAST PRICING DISPUTES

That portion of the settlement payment made to resolve disputes regarding
the proper price owed for minerals produced and sold from the lease
before the settlement agreement (including, but not limited to,
reimbursements for production-related costs, tax reimbursements,
appropriate Natural Gas Policy Act price category, or nonpayment of
contract purchase price by the purchaser, etc.) isroyalty bearing when
the lessee receives the payment.
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2
TAKE-OR-PAY
Settlement payments that are expressly subject to future recoupment
through make-uD deliveries are royalty bearing when and to the extent
recouped.
Where payments are made to settle past take-or-pay liabilities and the
purchaser has the right to recoup the settlement payment through future
deliveries of make-up production under an original, amended or successor
contract, royalty isdue on that portion of the settlement payment
allocable to resolution of the take-or-pay obligation as the payment is
applied to the make-up production.
Settlement payments that are not expressly subject to future recouoment
through make-up deliveries may be royalty bearing.
Where payments are made to settle past take-or-pay liabilities, but the
payment isnot expressly recoupable through future deliveries of make-up
production under an original, amended or successor contract, the royalty
liability will be determined based on the status of the purchaser's makeup rights at the time of settlement and the circumstances involving
future production from the lease.
Specifically, if the purchaser had make-up rights at the time of
settlement and production continues from the lease, the portion of the
settlement payment allocable to resolution of the take-or-pay obligation
relates in part to the gas which the purchaser had the right to take
under the make-up provisions of the original contract. Thus, ifvolumes
that would have been make-up volumes; i.e., volumes in excess of the
minimum take requirement under the original.contract, are produced and
taken by either the original or a substitute purchaser during the
original contract's make-up period, then the portion of the settlement
payment attributable to those volumes becomes royalty bearing as the
volumes that would have been make-up volumes are produced. Inthis case,
the payment istied to a volume of production that may be produced after
the settlement iseffective. Royalties on the attributed portion of the
settlement payment are due as this production occurs and are inaddition
to the royalties otherwise due on the product based upon the disposition
to the purchaser of those volumes.
If the original purchaser's make-up rights were expired at the time of
settlement, the portion of the settlement payment allocable to the
resolution of past take-or-pay liabilities isnot royalty bearing.
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CONTRACT "BUYDOWNS"
That portion of the settlement payment made to reduce the price to be
paid for future production to be taken by the original purchaser under an
amended or successor contract is royalty bearing as future production
occurs. The portion of the settlement payment allocable to this element
Is attributable to the production required to be taken during-the
remaining term of the original zontract. Specifically, if the settlement
agreement, or the payor's documents or workpapers generated
contemporaneously with the settlement agreement, includes a methodology
to allocate this portion of the settlement payment to determine the
amount attributable to each W'IBtu of volume for which the price was
2
bought down, MS will accept that allocation method if it is reasonable.
If there is no such acceptable allocation, payors should use the
following alternative method: the amount allocated to the buydown element
is divided by the total MlBtu required to'be taken under the amended or
successor contract during the remaining term of the original contract.
Under either the payor's allocation method or the allowed alternative
method, the resulting unit dollars per lIJBtu are then added to the
proceeds paid under the amended or successor contract to establish the
gross proceeds received for the volumes (up to the required minimum under
the amended or successor contract) produced and sold under that contract
during the remaining term of the original contract as and to the extent
that they are produced. This total sum establishes the minimum royalty
value for the production. Royalties are due on this value as production
occurs.
CONTRACT "BUYOUTS"
Payments made to extinguish a purchaser's obligation to take volumes in
the future under the contract being reformed or terminated are royalty
bearing to the extent that production of the "bought-outo volumes
(i.e., the reduction in the minimum take volume under the original
contract) continues from the lease under any successor contract with any
purchaser during the term of the original contract. The payment is
royalty bearing because it compensates the lessee for lower prices in the
future for the production foregone by the original purchaser. Some or
all of the portion of the settlement payment allocable to this element is
attributable to the bought-out volumes produced during the remaining term
of the original contract. Specifically, if the settlement agreement (or
the payor's documents or workpapers generated contemporaneously with the
settlement agreement) includes a methodology to allocate this portion of
the settlement payment to determine the amount attributable to each MWBtu
of bought-out volumes which is produced and sold to a substitute
purchaser, WIS will accept that allocation method if it is reasonable.
If there is no such acceptable allocation, payors should use the
following alternative method: the amount allocated to this element is
2 MBtu is the volume unit for natural gas, which is the subject of most
of the settlement agreements. If another mineral is involved, the appropriate
unit of volume would be substituted.
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4
divided by the total volume bought-out for the remaining term of the
original contract. Under either the payor's allocation method or the
allowed alternative method, the resulting unit dollars per WMtu are then
added to the proceeds paid under the substitute contract to establish the
gross proceeds received for the bought-out volumes produced and sold
under that contract as they are produced.
Payments made to extinguish a purchaser's obligation to take volumes in
the future are not royalty bearing Ifthere isno production inthe
future during the term of the original contract to which the payment can
be attributed.
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Enclosure 2
CONTRACT SETTrEM' T EXAMPLES
General Assumptions
S - seller/lessee
P, " original purchaser
P2 new or substitute purchaser
Original contract: 10-year term, 1 million
SS/MMBtu contract price

IBtu/year minimum take,

EXAMPLE I
Assumptions
1. P1 owes S $250,000 for FERC Order 94 series reimbursements.
2. P1 has an accrued take-or-pay liability of $3 million; the make-up
period under the original contract has expired.
3. In year 5 of the contract, P,and S enter into a settlement agreement:
. P1 pays S $5 million
SP,'s minimum take requirement-is reduced to 500,000 IMBtu/year and
P, takes that volume
P,'s price is reduced to S2/MMBtu
The term is 5 years from date of settlement
There is no successor contract for bought-out volumes during the
next 5 years.
Royalty Consequences
A. Any settlement amount allocable to resolution of the FERC Order 94
past pricing dispute is royalty bearing upon payment.
B. The portion of the settlement payment allocable to take-or-pay is not
royalty bearing because no make-up volumes are produced.
C. The portion of the settlement payment allocale to reduction in price
of the remaining 500,000 MMBtu/year from $5 to $2 (buydown) is royalty
bearing as production occurs over the next 5 years. Therefore,
royalty is due on $2/MMBtu plus the amount allocated to each IMtu of
production in accordance with the method described in the
interpretation.
D. The portion of the settlement payment allocated to buyout is not
royalty bearing because no bought-out volumes are produced under any
successor or substitute contract during the remaining term of the
original contract in this example.
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EXAMPLE 2
Assumptions are the same as example I except for bolded text:
1. P1 owes S $250,000 for FERC Order 94 series reimbursements.
2. P,has an accrued take-or-pay liability of $3 million; the make-up
period under the original contract has expired.
3. Inyear 5 of the contract, P, and S enter into a settlement agreement:
. P, pays.S $5 million.
.
Pi's minimum take requirement is reduced to 500,000 1'Btu/year,
but P,takes more than that volume.
Pi's price is reduced to $2/MMBtu.
The term is 5 years from date of settlement.
.
There is no successor contract for bought-out volumes during the
next 5 years.
The new contract with P, allows a new make-up period for take-orpay settlement payment.
Royalty Consequences (same as example I except for B.)
A. Any settlement amount allocable to resolution of the FERC Order 94
dispute is royalty bearing upon payment.
B. The portion of the settlement payment allocated to take-or-pay becomes
royalty bearing because P, takes in excess of 500,000 HfBtu/year
within new make-up period; the volumes taken in excess of 500,000
KMBtu/year are make-up volumes. Royalties should be paid as the
settlement payment is recouped through the delivery of the make-up gas
volumes.
C. The portion of the settlement payment allocable to reduction in price
of the remaining 500,000 MMStu/year from $5 to $2 is royalty bearing
as production occurs over the next 5 years. Therefore, royalty is due
on S2/MMBtu plus the amount allocated to each MMBtu of production in
accordance with the method described in the interpretation.
D. The portion of the settlement payment allocated to buyout is not
royalty bearing because no bought-out volumes are produced under any
successor or substitute contract during the remaining term of.the
original contract in this example.
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EXAHPLE 3
Assumptions same as Example I except bolded text:
1. P1 owes S $250,000 for FERC Order 94 series reimbursements.
2. PI has an accrued take-or-pay liability of $3 million; the make-up
period under the original contract for accrued take-or-pay liability
has not expired; 3 years remain.
3. In year 5 of the contract, P1 and S enter into a settlement agreement:
Pi pays S $5 million.
P,'s minimum take requirement is reduced to 500,000 MMBtu/year and
P1 takes that volume.
P,1 s price is reduced to $2/MMBtu.
.
The term is 5 years from date of settlement.
The make-up rights for take-or-pay payments under the original
contract are extinguished.
4. P, purchases 400,000 MNtu/year at $2/MNBtu for 5 years.
Royalty Consequences

(same as example 1 except D.)

A. Any settlement amount allocable to resolution of the FERC Order 94
dispute is royalty bearing upon payment.
B. The portion of the settlement payment allocable to take-or-pay is not
royalty bearing because no 'make-up" volumes are taken in excess of
original contract volumes.
C. The portion of the settlement payment allocable to reduction in price
of the remaining 500,000 MMBtu/year from $5 to $2 is royalty bearing
as production occurs over the next 5 years. Therefore, royalty is due
on $2/MMBtu plus the amount allocated to each IMBtu of production in
accordance with the method described in the' interpretation.
D. In accordance with the method described in the interpretation, the
portion of the settlement payment allocated to buyout isdivided by
the bought-out volume for the remaining term of the original contract
(2,500,000 HMBtu (.500,000 KBtu/year x 5 years)) to establish a unit
incremental value ($/MBtu), which is then added to the proceeds paid
for the 400,000 KMBtu/year of bought-out volumes which Pa takes over 5
years, and is royalty bearing as production occurs.
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EXAMPLE 4
Assumptions same as Example 3 except bolded text:
1. P,owe; S $250,000 for FERC Order 94 series reimbursements.
2. P1 has an accrued take-or-pay liability of $3 million; the make-up
period under the original contract for accrued take-or-pay liability
has not expired; 3 years remain.
3. In year S of the contract, P,and S enter into a settlement agreement:
P, pays S S5 million
P,'s minimum take requirement isreduced to 500,000 HMBtu/year and
P1 takes that volume
P,'s price-is reduced to S2/MMBtu
The term is5 years from date of settlement.
. The make-up rights for take-or-pay payments under the original
contract are extinguished.
-

4. P2 purchases 600,000 MMBtu/year at 52/lBtu for S years
Royalty CoiseQuences

(A.and C. are same as examples I and 3; B. and
D. are not)

A. Any settlement amount allocable to resolution of the FERC Order 94
dispute isroyalty bearing upon payment.
B. Inaccordance with the method described in the interpretation, the
portion of the settlement payment allocated to take-or-pay is divided
by the make-up volume to which P, had the right to take under the
original contract (600,000 HlMBtu (m$3,000,000 e $5/MMBtu)) to
establish an incremental value. This value will be added to the
otherwise applicable royalty value for the 100,000 MBtu/year of
gmake-up" gas for 3 years and Isroyalty bearing as that production
occurs.
C. The portion of the settlement payment allocable to reduction inprice
of the remaining 500,000 1MBtu/year from $5 to £2 isroyalty bearing
as production occurs over the next 5 years. Therefore, royalty is due
on S2/N4Btu plus the amount allocated to each MWBtu of production in
accordance with the method described in the interpretation.
D. In accordance with the method described in the interpretation, the
portion of the settlement payment allocated to buyout is divided by
the bought-out volume for the remaining term of the original contract
(2,500,000 HStu (.S00,000 1Btu/year x 5 years)) to establish a unit
incremental value ($/MHBtu), which Is then added to the proceeds paid
for the 500,000 KMBtu/year of bought-out volumes which P. takes over 5
years, aind isroyalty bearing as production occurs.
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Enclosure 3
Please refer to the following matrix when paying additional royalties related
to contract settlement payments. Note that Transaction Code (TC) 31 is to be
used. Instructions for using this TC are not included in your Payor Handbook.
For this TC, you must complete the following fields for each line:
* Accounting Identification Number
* Product Code
e Selling Arrangement
Sales Month
* Transaction Code
* Sales Quantity
* Sales Value
* Royalty Quantity
* Royalty Value
* Payment Method Code
If under the interpretations contained in this letter you determine that
certain payments you received now have a royalty liability because those
payments are allocable to ongoing production, you should report and pay for
the production from the date of the settlement to the current month in
accordance with the instruction under Category 2a. You should continue to
report future production as outlined in Category 2b or you may elect to make a
lump sum payment. In this Instance, you should follow the guidelines outlined
In Category 3.
Future volume adjustments for settlement payments made using the guidelines in
the matrix may require the correction of one or both lines depending on the
situation. Please follow the reporting requirements outlined in the Payor
Handbook or contact your Royalty Reports and Payments Branch Representative.
Ifyou have any questions concerning reporting on the Report of Sales and
Royalty Remittance Form MIS-2014, please contact Barbara Lambert on 303-2313289.
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United States Department of the Interior

AW
*''

MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE
WASHINGTON. DC 20240

AMG 3 V-93
Dear Royalty Payor or Reporter:
The Minerls Management Service W? S) has recently completed a thorough review of its
administatve appeal process as provided for in 30 CFR 290 (1992). In conductng our
review, we sought the comments and recommendations from our constituens, industry,
States and tribes, and from our own staff on uys to improve the process. We are pleased to
announce that the MMS has identified a number of improvements to the appeals process
which will be implemented in the coming weeks. Each change is briefly summarized below.
1. Filine Statements of Reasons (SOR),
When MMS issues an Order to Pay (Bill for Collection) or an Order to Perform to
the reporter, the language in the order will inform the reporter that in the event the
order is timely appmled, the SOR providing the appellant's argument for reversing or
modifying the order will be due within 60 days of the receipt date of the order.
However, in response to industry requests, for certain complex issue appeals mainly
from audit offices, appellants will now have 90 days from the receipt date of the
order to supply any SOR. (Before this change, appellants had only 60 days to file
SORs, but extensions were common).
Tme extensions to these filing periods will not be permitted unless requested in
writing by the appellant, with justification showing good cause for the time extension,
and submitted to the designated Deputy Associate Director, at the address shown on
the order. We expect that delays in processing the appeal for lack of information will
be significantly reduced by this change.
2. MMS Field Renorts.
When the responsible MMS office completes the field report after an appeal is filed,
the report will be sent simultaneously to the MMS Appeals and Litigation Support
Division and to the appellant. (Currently, field reports are sent out later in the
process by the Appeals and Litigation Support Division). MMS will consider any
response to the field report provided by the appellant if it is received by MMS at the
appropriate address within 21 days of the date of the letter transmitting the field
report to the appellant. This accelerated process of information sharing will more
quickly clarify the hcta record and reduce the time needed to process the appeal.
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3. Time Frames for MMS,
MMS has established internal time frames for each phase of the appeals process.
Starting with the preparation of the field report and progressing through the issuance
of the final decision, each step of the process will be monitored to eliminate
unnecessary delay. Because of the current appeals workload, however, it may take
some time to see the full benefit of thes improvements.
4. MMS A~oeals Tracldno System.
A new common M,S appeals tracking system is being established that will
consolidate the various systems currently being used throughout MMS to record and
monitor appeals cases. Starting when the appeal is filed by the appellant, a docket
number will be assigned to the case and entered into an automated tracking system.
We expect that this system will allow MMS to be more responsive to an'appellant's
requests on the status of an appeal.
5. MMS A

ileas
Coordinator,

An appeals coordinator is being designated in each MMS operating division along
with select members of the State and Tribal Royalty Audit Committee to hacilitate
inquiries by the appellant. The coordinator will be identified in the acknowledgment
letter to the appellant upon receipt of the appeal. More effective communication and
follow up on the appeal status will result'because of the designated MMS contact
point for appeal inquiries.
As we implement these recommendations in the near term, we will continue to seek ways to
further improve the appeals process over the long term. We already have received many
suggestions that merit further consideration, and we welcome any suggestions you may have.
Most of these near tewn initiatives are in the process of implementation and will take effect
on September 1, 1993. We ask for your continued support as we endeavor to smurlne
government and improve the MMS administrative appeals process.
Sincerely,

and Management Improvement
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